

VOLUME II, NUMBER 4, FALL 2002

CLAREMONT

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A Journal of Political Thought and Statesmanship

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REMEMBERING 9/11

by Charles R. Kesler

A YEAR LATER, WE'VE FOUND NO BETTER WAY to refer to the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., than "9/11." The simultaneous assault on two cities rules out a geographical name, like Pearl Harbor or Gettysburg. Probably the only other date burned so indelibly into the American consciousness is the Fourth of July, though it, unlike September 11, has a proper name: Independence Day. The massacres of a year ago are referred to almost exclusively by numbers (Arabic numerals, at that), by the date, which caught on partly because of the coincidence with 9-1-1, the well-known emergency telephone number. 9/11 was an emergency call answered by thousands of firemen and policemen, hundreds of whom lost their lives in the World Trade Center.

July 4 is significant for something Americans did; September 11 for something that was done to us. The identification of the vicious attacks with a date impresses us with the arbitrariness of the attacks on *that day*, emphasizes almost the fatedness of them, as though an existential stroke of doom had befallen us. We saw the images, over and over and over again, of those shimmering airplanes crashing into the Twin Towers, but it was still hard to fathom that the planes caused the buildings' collapse. Our minds associated the events together, the impact preceding the downfall, but that the one caused the other remained a thought somehow so appalling that it was hard to believe. We had to see the images again.

Still more unfathomable was the cause behind the cause—the terrorists' motive in attacking our people and buildings. How to describe it, to conceive it? It was (still is) hard for us, and so the day's events remained for a while an effect without a cause, a mystery; indeed, a kind of evil miracle. Our enemies saw in it Allah's hand. The word most used to describe it in the early going was "tragedy," which suggested inexplicable suffering, as though an earthquake had toppled the towers. Of course, "tragedy" also implied a tragic flaw: the Twin Towers' fall recalled, dimly, memories of the story of the Tower of Babel. The daring of the Towers' architecture, their very altitude, seemed to have invited the stroke of fate. And was man really meant to fly?

And so the political meaning of 9/11 has been less clear than one might have expected. To be sure, the political reaction has been impressive—a formidable military and diplomatic effort culminating in the war in Afghanistan, which crushed the Taliban, disrupted al-Qaeda, and sent

Osama bin Laden...somewhere he did not want to be. To the extent these operations had a slogan, it was "Let's Roll," the last recorded words of Todd Beamer, one of the passengers on United Flight 93, which crashed in the Pennsylvania countryside. His words were uttered at a very American moment, after the passengers had said a prayer and taken a vote to resist their murderous captors.

But "Let's Roll" became a kind of slogan precisely because it signaled heroic resistance in a moment of otherwise disheartening national paralysis. President Bush adopted the phrase when he led the nation to war in Afghanistan. But a year after 9/11, is America still rolling forward?

President Bush pointed out repeatedly that 9/11 had reminded Americans of the difference between good and evil, vanquishing the moral confusion of our times. There's little doubt that most Americans exhibit such moral confidence: they know who the bad guys are and why they are bad. Yet already there are signs that this patriotic resolve may erode—certainly there are many on the extreme Left who would like to erode it, and many more in the liberal center who may be unable to resist the extremists' arguments.

One of the great themes of liberal postmodernism is that the past has nothing to teach us: that history is all interpretation, and morals and politics are entirely relative. Is it to some extent a reflection of this view that the atrocities of 9/11 have not, like previous insults against America, been made into a watchword meant to engage our memory and our conscience? Think how past generations of Americans did this: Remember Pearl Harbor. Remember the Lusitania. Remember the Maine. Remember the Alamo.

Yet no one says, "Remember 9/11." We may wish it, but it's not on our lips, our billboards, or our televisions. We have not vowed it, at least not as we should. Without such a political watchword, we are prone to forget why and where we are "rolling." Victory loses its luster, and its urgency, when prescinded from the reasons we fight. Our enemies struck at us not so much because of anything we had done but because of the kind of nation we are; a nation that prays and votes freely. Let us defy them, and at the same time save ourselves, by recalling who we are and what we stand for. 9-1-1 is a call for help. 9/11 must be a call to arms. Remember 9/11.

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
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THE HOME FRONT: LEFT, RIGHT, AND (ELUSIVE) CENTER

Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got to Be So Hated, by Gore Vidal. Thunder's Mouth Press, 160 pages, \$10

Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism, by William J. Bennett. Doubleday, 170 pages, \$19.95

What's So Great About America, by Dinesh D'Souza. Regnery Publishing, Inc., 218 pages, \$27.95

Where We Stand: 30 Reasons for Loving Our Country, by Roger Rosenblatt. Harcourt, Inc., 194 pages, \$16.95

Book Review by Christopher Flannery

[S]ince 1947 America has been the chief and pioneering perpetrator of 'preemptive' state terror. . . .

For several decades there has been an unremitting demonization of the Muslim world in the American media. . . .

Once we meditate upon the unremitting violence of the United States against the rest of the world . . . one begins to understand why Osama struck at [America] . . . in the name of 1 billion Muslims. . . .

WELCOME TO THE WORLD OF GORE Vidal. Looking down from his villa, *La Rondinaia*, nestled in 12 lovely acres perched high above Italy's Amalfi coast, Vidal thinks that he sees things unnoticed by lesser mortals—especially those very lesser mortals who have been proudly and defiantly flying the American flag this past year.

In *il mondo* Vidal, "most of today's actual terrorists can be found within [American] governments, federal, state, municipal" (a note for innocents: Vidal does not mean terrorists working *against* our governments). The unremitting terror that America inflicts upon the outer world is amply mirrored by the terror inflicted by the American "police state" upon its own citizens. America's terrorist police state is in the grips of a "Pentagon junta," goaded on by the "neofascist" *Wall Street Journal* and promoted by the "provincial war lovers" at *The New York Times*, whose "mindset" is essentially indistin-

guishable from the neofascists down the street. And the afflicted citizenry? Sheep. And not just your garden variety, easily bewildered, too easily led but lovable lambs. No, these are sheep worth loathing.

Vidal concedes that Americans today are endangered by an "absolutist religious order," but the danger emanates from the U.S. Justice Department and the Supreme Court, where a Christian conspiracy is afoot that traces its roots back to real fascists. The immediate occasion for Vidal's book is the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States for which Osama bin Laden takes credit, but the book consists mainly of old Vidal essays from *Vanity Fair* and *The Nation* on other subjects. Most of its pages are devoted to Timothy McVeigh and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. "With both bin Laden and McVeigh," writes Vidal, "I thought it useful to describe the various provocations on our side that drove them to such terrible acts" and make them "understandable."

Conspiracy theorists to this day continue to speculate (with Vidal) that McVeigh was connected with international Islamist terror networks—but that is tame stuff. Vidal wants his readers seriously to consider the possibility that the Oklahoma City bombing was a conspiracy by agents of the federal government analogous to the Nazis' burning the Reichstag in 1933—to justify further strengthening of the American terror-police state. And September 11? Well, it never hurts to keep an open mind.

Gore Vidal has always liked to be a naughty

boy, but it is hard for him to keep it up at 77. His perverse passions are beyond the wane. He comes across as an aging scold, desperately applying the rouge. To give him his due, he can still pretend to be aroused by a remarkable variety of objects. To get a sense of his range, imagine him sporting with ironic pride a World War II uniform and wandering around his medieval town of Ravello, crying from the heart: "Remember Ruby Ridge and Waco—and stop persecuting the pedophiles!" But although his book manages to be eccentric, intemperate, and paranoid, it is primarily lazy.

He markets his book as a work of intellectual and political daring, too explosively heterodox for even the most left-wing American publication. In truth, although its eccentricities can be inadvertently amusing, the book is the bearer of tired old news. Its central message has been rehearsed and rehashed by and for the intellectual, cultural, and academic establishments of the Western world for decades. The message is—hold on to your hats—that in this troubled and complex world the essential thing to understand is that Americans are not "the good guys."

Vidal is about as shocking as Julia Child. As he himself boasts, his odd little collection of recycled essays was "an instant best-seller" when first published in Italian and was quickly "translated in a dozen other languages." The American edition has been for weeks on the (neofascist!) *New York Times* best-seller list. In his brief American tour to promote the book Vidal was greeted with gleeful applause by (sheepish?) audiences of college students and other well-fed

fans who knew as well as Vidal and his publishers that anti-Americanism is as American as apple pie, and sells like hotcakes.

STILL, THE OLD NEWS DOES TAKE ON A fresh significance in the world made new by the events of September 11. And it is in opposition to both the old and the new anti-Americanism that William Bennett writes his book.

Bennett writes at the end of 2001, not about the military battle but about the “battle of public opinion” that accompanies it, that can decisively affect it, and that promises to continue for a long time to come. Bennett is, of course, engaged in this battle. He writes to defend and sustain what he regards as the encouraging response of America to the attacks of September 11—the unity, patriotism, and, in particular, the righteous anger, that are necessary conditions for a successful prosecution of the war. This patriotic response needs to be defended because of the barrage of arguments that descended upon it immediately from what he calls America’s “peace party”: America brought the attacks upon itself; the President’s rhetoric of “good” and “evil” is more dangerous than the terrorist threat; this is a “mad rush to war”; we must above all beware of “Islamophobia” and overreaction; conflict and confrontation never solve anything; we must seek a multilateral solution, etc.

But the arguments of the “peace party” are merely the latest expression of a deep-rooted intellectual and civic disposition, which Bennett (borrowing the term) calls the “debellicization” of America. His book is intended, so to speak, to *rebellicize* America. He wants to help restore the political conviction in the American mind that seemed to have been lost but came forcefully to life on September 11—namely, that “some things are worth fighting and dying for,” and that America and Western Civilization are certainly among them.

Bennett’s strategic intellectual concern must therefore be the “adversary culture”—the moral relativists, postmodernists, multiculturalists, and assorted Leftists entrenched in American educational and cultural institutions—who have successfully taught a generation of Americans that on the one hand nothing is right or wrong and on the other America and Western Civilization are great evils.

Bennett is determined, but he is not optimistic. So deeply rooted are the Left’s disabling ideas that it will be a “work of generations” to uproot them and replace them with healthier growths. A “deep revolution in consciousness,” a “vast relearning,” must take place before America can fully regain the “moral clarity” that is needed. While our armed forces are doing their work—and long after they are done—our

politicians and public officials, clergymen, mothers and fathers, and above all “educators, at every level,” must undertake this larger work. They must restore to public authority the reasoned ground for distinguishing right from wrong and for defending America and the civilization it represents.

If there is any cause for optimism in this endeavor, it lies in something like the following reflections. Reason—and even, surprisingly, history—is on the side of “the good guys.” The case that there is a rational ground for distinguishing good from evil, for example, is just intrinsically stronger than the alternatives that have been fashionable for so many years. And the intellectual exhaustion of these nihilist alternatives produces, with each new terrorist attack, a stronger odor of overripe fruit. The strained attempts by Stanley Fish in recent months to demonstrate the moral seriousness of postmodernism are a case in point: “Stand up and fight for . . . whatever!”

Great ratiocination, to be sure, is still required—will always be required—on behalf of common sense and common decency. But the efforts are interesting, and each small victory adds relish to the work. And as reason regains the ground that has been ceded for so long to the various lunacies of the Left (and Right), a more fair and balanced—a more reasonable—view of history cannot help but follow.

In this reasoned view, Western Civilization has nothing to fear from comparisons. Quite the contrary, the rediscovery of its glories (and the increasingly vivid contrasts with the alternatives) has every chance of inspiring a global renaissance. As for America, its detractors and debunkers have made their case for many, many years. The title of Gore Vidal’s book, for example, is taken from that pioneering debunker, progressive historian Charles Beard, whose work was exciting 80 years ago, around the time Mr. Vidal was born. The lasting influence of Beard’s work does indeed demonstrate that bad (and fully refuted) ideas can last a long time and do a lot of damage. And certainly there are able successors to Beard who continue quite energetically to spread false rumors about America. But as for the future, when the old panjandrum of political correctness have assumed eternal emeritus standing, will American students continue to be taught *ad nauseam* that America is evil to the core? There is a good fighting chance that they will not. If truth is intrinsically stronger than slander—and it is—there is reason to hope that things will change, so long as the champions of truth stick to their guns.

In the (optimist’s) future, the ravings of Gore Vidal and the anti-American diatribes of his high-salaried comrades in the “adversary culture” will be gathering dust in the museum of

twentieth century intellectual malice. A fair and informed history will teach a coming generation of students, in Bennett’s words, that whatever may be America’s many faults,

we have provided more freedom to more people than any nation in the history of mankind; that we have provided a greater degree of equality to more people than any nation in the history of mankind; that we have created more prosperity, and spread it more widely, than any nation in the history of mankind; that we have brought more justice to more people than any nation in the history of mankind; that our open, tolerant, prosperous, peaceable society is the marvel and envy of the ages.

IF OUR “VAST RELEARNING” IS ULTIMATELY to succeed, Bennett argues that it must especially recover “the American idea,” the American “vision.” But what is that vision? Dinesh D’Souza has some ideas about this, and they are, as usual, engaging and provocative.

If you have a ring in your nose, a tongue stud, loads of tattoos, spiked hair, an overblown estimation of your own authenticity, no particular interest in America, and absolutely no ability to aid in her defense, D’Souza wants to talk with you. Bill Bennett writes deliberately in anger; D’Souza writes in love. As Pericles appealed to ancient Athenians to fall in love with Athens, D’Souza would show contemporary Americans, and especially America’s pierced and tattooed youth, the good in America that should make them love their country. It is urgently necessary to articulate this good in the immediate circumstances, not only because American and Western intellectuals have done so much to obscure it, but because our Islamist enemies are themselves animated by “an intelligent and even profound assault on the very basis of America and the West.”

D’Souza, like Bennett, writes to defend American patriotism. He defends it not only against American detractors, but against European, Asian, and in particular Islamic critics of America and the West. An adequate defense, he rightly argues, requires “an examination of first principles.” A “genuine patriot loves his country not only because it is his, but . . . because it is good.” But D’Souza differs explicitly with Bennett and other “cultural conservatives” because they identify America’s goodness with outdated ideas like the principles of the American Founders. They do not take sufficiently into account the “moral revolution” that took place in America in the 1960s and 70s, as a consequence of which “America became a different country.” As a result of this revolution, “a new morality is

now entrenched and pervasive" in America, and it is not only imprudent but wrong not to try to accommodate it.


The new morality—the new America—is especially to be found among American youths. And D'Souza's book is in part an attempt to reach out to them, which he thinks conservatives like Bennett are incapable of doing. To reach out to them, he accepts what he takes to be their vision—the new morality—at least up to a point.

AT THE ROOT OF THIS NEW MORALITY IS a new vision of "freedom." The founders understood human freedom to be intelligible only within a moral order that exists and can be understood independently of individual passions and interests and that must be nurtured within an authoritative tradition. The new freedom, inherited mainly from Rousseau, is the freedom of the individual to "determine what is good" unencumbered by any external "moral order" or principles or traditions. It is an "inner freedom," an "authenticity" that can be found only through the genuine expression of the "self." This "ethic of authenticity" has even been endorsed, and perfectly encapsulated, by the Supreme Court, "when it declared [in 1992] that all Americans have a 'right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.'" This is now the idea that "America stands for"; this is the vision to which we owe "moral allegiance."

To personify the new American, D'Souza conjures from his experience "the Starbucks guy"—with "the Mohawk hair, the earrings, the nose ring, the studs on his forehead and tongue, the tattoos." The Starbucks guy would dismiss people like Bennett or Robert Bork as "fascists," "enemies of freedom," "un-American," "self-righteous mullah[s]," trying to take away his "inalienable right to determine his own destiny, to make his own choices." And D'Souza thinks the Starbucks guy is largely right. First, because in a democratic society it is impossible to "enforce norms based on a moral order that is no longer shared by the community." The new freedom has become "America's core value." It is fruitless and even un-American to oppose this new American vision. But, in addition, Rousseau's idea of freedom is at least partly true. Conservatives should "embrace it," if somewhat gingerly. They should "acknowledge the legitimacy of the ideal of authenticity." They could then engage the Starbucks guy in conversation, leading him from his mantra "I can choose for myself" to the question "What are you going to choose?" and from his insistence on "the autonomy of choice" to "some substantive understanding of the good life."

"[T]he question of the content of the good life," says D'Souza, is the central question both for Western Civilization and for the American founders. The new morality of the 1960s and 1970s abandoned that question. Celebrating their "radical freedom," the new Americans ceased to ask "what that freedom is for." It is the conservatives' challenge to resurrect that question. "Their mission . . . is to steer the American ethic of authenticity to its highest manifestation and to ennoble freedom by showing it the path to virtue."

D'Souza's rhetorical (and logical) problem is that he has presented the "path to virtue" as the path to a dead past, the path to nowhere. Having buried the old America (alongside Western Civilization), he wants to invite the Starbucks guy to join it and, even more difficult, he then wants to summon the corpse to the defense of the new



America and the Starbucks guy for which it stands. Praising the heroes of September 11 and the armed forces on which American liberties and civilization itself depend, D'Souza sensibly writes: "Authenticity, thank God, is not the operating principle of the U.S. military. America's enemies should not expect to do battle against the Starbucks guy." Suddenly the America that had died a few pages earlier is revived and sent into battle. It becomes the "older, sturdier culture of courage, nobility, and sacrifice . . . that will protect the liberties of all Americans, including that of the Starbucks guy."

D'Souza is right to want to make America, and virtue, and conservatives more appealing to American youth (though the Starbucks guy is not very promising material). But he underestimates what the principles of the American founders have to contribute to this. The founders' idea of freedom is more robust than he realizes. As for Rousseau, D'Souza underestimates his potency as well. Rousseau's teaching of unfettered freedom contributes mightily to doctrines of unfettered will. The "noble savage" does not have to travel far to meet the "blond beast." The "ethic of authenticity" is not the ground on which to build if we are to ennoble American freedom.

ROGER ROSENBLATT JOINS BENNETT AND D'Souza in defending the American "way of life." He, too, has written a book about "love of country." But Rosenblatt accurately presents himself as "the conventional liberal." On the one hand, he departs decisively from the anti-American Left in having affectionate respect for ordinary Americans, in wanting "to make a case for preserving the core values of the country," and in his belief that "the country has... done more to benefit the rest of the world than any in history." On the other hand, he despises "purveyors of simple-minded virtue, like William Bennett." It is, therefore, no simple-minded book that he writes.

Rosenblatt has barely finished professing his "love of country" before his liberal conscience compels him to assure the reader that this is no "unalloyed love." It is "complicated." He will, indeed, try to make a case for preserving America's "core values," but at the same time he will be arguing on behalf of "all the oddities and nonsense that make us us." Alas, the core is immediately and hopelessly lost in the complications. The book—and America—fragments into oddities, and especially into nonsense. The 30 "love songs" deliberately meander from one jejune paradox or self-celebratory self-contradiction to the next. What Rosenblatt proudly thinks he finds at America's core is a "clear inner confession of mixed feelings." But this is really a work more of introspection than of observation. What he has discovered is the confusion of his own conventional liberal soul.

Although his age would seem to make this impossible, Rosenblatt writes as if he were a graduate of the self-esteem curriculum that has prevailed in America in recent years. He is "sure that [his] book contains some lusus of errors and porous arguments," but so what! He writes it anyway, because "I felt like writing it, felt like saying anything I chose to say, and knew that I had the freedom to say it." Give him at least a gold star for honesty—he is right about the lusus and the pores. To mention a few: When trying to talk reverently about the founders, he mistakes Hamilton for Madison; he discovers that "the Constitution . . . states that government has no right to prevent free expression"; and he has the odd recollection that "Clinton was not impeached."

As if to complete the liberal stereotype, Rosenblatt gives us a weepy book, in which the author goes misty on us and wants us to share his weepiness, and in which America is lovable in part because it is inclined to be weepy, too. But he is not done.

Rosenblatt is celebrated on his dust jacket

as a writer and a teacher of writing at Harvard University. But his explanation of the title of his book shows that he is no prose model for undergraduates and, as a bonus, offers a memorable image of the hapless divagations of American liberalism:

These are the pillars of the Republic: to protect the weaker, to rescue the endangered, to dignify every individual, but centrally, to continue the search for a more noble expression of existence. However we have blundered in the history of this search, it is *where we stand* [italics added].

Leave aside that these pillars do not seem exactly to be cut from Washingtonian marble. Are they not moving around a bit too much for good pillar work? Especially that central pillar that seems to be on an endless search? And it

is on this endlessly searching pillar that “we stand” as Americans. Here the muse of liberalism took hold of Roger Rosenblatt’s quill



pen and, unbeknownst to him, revealed for all to see the conventional liberal’s plight. The ground keeps shifting beneath him. His pillars keep moving. And as a consequence, though he does genuinely want to love his country, he can-

not come up with a cogent reason for doing so.

All of which tells us that, in an America that is asking serious questions with an urgency not felt in years, conventional liberalism has nothing serious to say. The battle of public opinion is between the anti-American Left that commands the strategic cultural heights of the Ivory Tower and the Hollywood Hills and the pro-American Right that occupies the American plains. The conventional liberal wants to be pro-American, but he takes his bearings from the Tower and the Hills. And so he wanders weepily on his weary pillars, back and forth across the land. What are the prospects in the battle? If you are a betting American and any kind of an optimist, put your money on the good guys, and hope they can work out that vision thing.

Christopher Flannery is associate editor of the Claremont Review of Books.

Book Review by Patrick J. Garrity

SMALL WARS, BIG DEAL

The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power,
by Max Boot. Basic Books, 428 pages, \$30

LAST FALL, DEFENSE SECRETARY DONALD Rumsfeld proudly showed photographs of U.S. special forces troops riding on horseback in Afghanistan. Rumsfeld explained how these American soldiers acted as liaison with the opposition forces, living as they lived, traveling as they traveled, fighting where they fought; while still bringing to bear the decisive advantages of modern technology in the form of precision-guided munitions carried by B-2 bombers.

This is indeed a great story but, as Max Boot writes, it is hardly unprecedented. The U.S. military has been engaged in “the savage wars of peace” (Kipling’s phrase) since the early days of the Republic. Americans tend to remember the big wars—lately, the War of the Greatest Generation (World War II). They assume that the country is either at war—fully mobilized against a major adversary; determined upon total victory through the enemy’s surrender after the defeat of its armed forces—or it is at peace. In fact, as Boot points out, these periods of peace have been punctuated with small wars, what others call “low intensity conflicts” or in a related category, “military operations other than war.” Between 1800

and 1934, for instance, the Marine Corps staged 180 landings abroad, including on the fabled shores of Tripoli, the isthmus of Panama, the Samoan islands, and Leyte Gulf in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War.

Boot, the editorial features editor of *The Wall Street Journal*, seeks to redress our understanding of American military history in order to provide a different strategic model for the uncertain world we now face. He divides small wars into four types: punitive (to punish attacks on American citizens or property), protective (to safeguard American citizens or property), pacification (to occupy foreign territory), and profiteering (to grab trade or territorial concessions). There is a certain imprecision in distinguishing between big and small wars, but you will know the latter when you see them—campaigns fought by a relatively small number of professional soldiers, pursuing limited objectives with limited means, often against irregular forces. Although Boot acknowledges the role of the U.S. Army and Navy in small wars, he focuses on the special expertise of the Marine Corps, captured most notably in its *Small Wars Manual* of 1940.

When you think about it, as Boot does for us,

America’s small wars have involved an astonishing range of unilateral and multilateral actions. American forces waged naval and amphibious war against the Barbary States of North Africa to guarantee freedom of commerce in the Mediterranean, and fought to rescue the foreign legations in Beijing during the Boxer uprising in China. In Mexico, General John J. Pershing pursued Pancho Villa in response to cross-border raids just before American entry into World War I. At about the same time, U.S. Marines landed in Haiti and stayed for 19 years (eight years in the Dominican Republic). The Vietnam War began as a U.S. counterinsurgency campaign. Boot recalls other less prominent cases that have largely disappeared from our historical consciousness, if they were ever present at all.

Boot is a bracing storyteller, and one of the book’s strengths is his recounting of some of these forgotten episodes. For example, Second Lieutenant George S. Patton wangled a staff appointment with Pershing in the Mexican expedition, and then dashed off with a small unit to search for one of Villa’s key generals. Using his ivory-handled Colt .45 revolver, Patton shot several Mexicans off their horses, including the general, whose corpse

he lashed to the fender of his Dodge touring car for the trip back to camp. Pershing referred to Patton affectionately as "my bandit."

For the most part, these professional soldiers labored in obscurity. Brigadier General "Fighting Fred" Funston did achieve contemporary fame when he helped end the Philippine War by capturing rebel leader Emilio Aguinaldo. Funston used friendly Filipino natives to pose as reinforcements for Aguinaldo's forces. These counterfeit rebels "guarded" Funston and four other American officers who pretended to be prisoners of war. They infiltrated the rebels' heavily guarded camp in the remote mountains of northeastern Luzon and seized Aguinaldo, who later issued a proclamation accepting American sovereignty and calling on his comrades to give up the struggle.

CERTAIN POINTS STAND OUT FROM READING Boot's account. First, small wars happen. The United States is a global power with strategic, political, economic, and moral interests. Many nations and groups don't much like us. Even without looking for trouble, the United States, and its citizens abroad, will inevitably find it.

Second, small wars often follow a pattern; we should avoid having to learn the same lesson twice or thrice in dealing with particular peoples and regions. Thomas Jefferson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan all had to deal with hostage crises and terrorism in North Africa. The United States first intervened militarily in Haiti in 1915 (not 1994). American forces have been involved in suppressing Muslim rebels in the Philippines, off and on, for over a century. Troops from the Asiatic Squadron landed at Inchon in Korea—to open trade and assure the protection of shipwrecked sailors—in 1871. Chances are the Persian Gulf and Central Asia will become new theaters for small wars, whatever the fate of Iraq.

Afghanistan demonstrates the costs of treating small wars as one-time affairs. After the Soviet invasion in 1979, American officials in the field did more than support the resistance. They developed an understanding of which opposition leaders were competent, reasonably honest, and favorably inclined to the West—and which were not. They learned something of the terrain, the weather and the tribes, of the goals and interests of outside powers such as Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia. But when the Soviets withdrew and the Cold War ended, Afghanistan no longer seemed so important. Experts retired or were reassigned. American political officials paid rela-

tively little attention to the seemingly obscure civil war that continued to rage there. Much of this neglect was perhaps understandable. It will not be so in the future. We cannot assume the last small war has been fought in and around Central Asia.

Third, small wars often lead not to clean, quick exits but to messy long-term commitments. Americans cannot expect to "butcher and bolt," the blunt expression that Boot takes from the British Army in India, describing punitive expeditions into hostile territory. President Clinton may have promised that the United States would be out of Bosnia in a year, but he knew better, and we should too. Americans ought not aspire to govern other peoples as an end in itself. But history shows that we will often be forced to do so—as in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, Haiti in 1915, the Dominican Republic in 1916, as well as the "big war" occupations of Germany and Japan—or at least to work with the locals to see that some measure of good governance is in place. The ultimate success of small wars often turns on "draining the swamp," literally and figuratively, that gave rise to the problem in the first place.

Boot argues persuasively that American occupations have improved the short-term lot of the locals from the standpoint of health, education, infrastructure, the rule of law, and the like. Indeed, these impressive benefits have often been America's greatest asset in fighting small wars: the vast majority of the indigenous population will not support armed resistance once it realizes that it is better off under a Marine constabulary (or its equivalent) than under local misrule. Once American forces leave, the record is mixed. Haiti is still not "fixed" nearly a century after the first U.S. military intervention. But the cases of Germany and Japan—and the Philippines, which shows a stubbornly democratic culture years after gaining independence from the United States—indicate that patience and commitment to good, democratic governance can pay real dividends.

Finally, the best perhaps that American military power can do to support democracy abroad is to help maintain, in critical regions, the overall security and peace. The success of the United States in World War II and the Cold War led to one way of thinking about how to maintain regional stability—being prepared to deter and fight big wars. The Cold War featured small wars but they were regarded as sideshows, always to be viewed in the context of a possible big war. In Vietnam we fought a small war with big war tactics, imprudently (so Boot concludes), and lost. The uniformed military vowed to fight only


when public support was manifest, the application of force overwhelming, the definition of victory obvious, with an agreed-upon "exit strategy" to terminate any American occupation. Victory in Iraq (the Gulf War) seemed to confirm this model. American officers developed a great aversion to fighting in difficult places, in cities and jungles and mountains, where the line between combatant and civilian is difficult if not impossible to determine. That is, the military—and its civilian leadership, for the most part—lost confidence in the value and feasibility of fighting small wars.

THE HISTORICAL RECORD RECOUNTED by Boot, however, demonstrates that Americans are pretty good at small wars, and small wars have an important place in U.S. national strategy. American soldiers and sailors have demonstrated the skill, innovation, courage, and resolution to fight and win (or at least endure) the costs and risks of small wars. But he goes too far by creating a stark dichotomy between big and small wars and drawing absolute conclusions, such as "small wars cannot be fought with big war methods." To be sure, the forces and techniques needed to attack a terrorist camp or pacify a failed state differ in important ways from those required to deter or defeat a major power. But we cannot assume that small wars will now dominate the horizon, as Boot's analysis seems to suggest. The challenge to American military leadership, civilian and uniformed, is to ensure that there is creative tension, rather than opposition, among the various elements of the armed forces; and that those forces are used innovatively and effectively, whatever the scale of conflict. The events of the past year may demonstrate that the big war/small war distinction is actually breaking down: Americans may face various forms of conflict involving simultaneously terrorists, rogue states, and major powers.

Most importantly, there needs to be a strategic connection between military operations of all kinds. The United States once fought small wars overseas principally to prevent big wars, or to see that big wars were fought on the most favorable terms. In the future, the United States likely will undertake smaller-scale military operations, in conjunction with intelligence-gathering units, law enforcement agencies, and the like, in order to prevent the equivalent of a big war—mass-casualty, civilization-threatening attacks—from occurring again on American soil.

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SYMPOSIUM



THE PATH TO VICTORY

NINE DAYS AFTER THE FIENDISH ATTACKS ON NEW YORK CITY AND WASHINGTON, D.C., President George W. Bush declared that any nation sponsoring, aiding, or harboring terrorists would be considered an enemy of the United States. In October, American forces launched punishing airstrikes on Afghanistan, then the headquarters of al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. Assaulted by the land, sea, and air forces of the U.S. and its allies, Afghanistan's Taliban regime soon collapsed. In November, the *Claremont Review of Books* published an essay by Angelo Codevilla titled "Victory: What it Will Take to Win." In it, and in two subsequent essays, Codevilla, professor of international relations at Boston University and a spirited analyst of (and participant in) U.S. foreign and defense policy, argued that the U.S. "war on terrorism" is misconceived, that the focus on al-Qaeda and bin Laden is shortsighted, and that the homeland security measures are futile. To win the war, he contended, the United States must topple the regimes that make terrorists like Osama bin Laden possible, specifically the despots and ruling parties of Iraq, Syria, and the Palestinian Authority. As the anniversary of September 11 approaches—and as the war enters its second year—we asked five distinguished commentators to reflect on Codevilla's assessment of the war. His reply follows.

William F. Buckley, Jr.
Editor-at-Large, *National Review*

ONE OF THE DEPOSITS OF ANGELO Codevilla, with almost every one of his essays, is deep, heavy *gloom*. His analysis is so shrewd, his sense of human nature and its drives so highly developed, he confidently tells us what is going to happen, and it is quite awful. In the first of his essays for the *Claremont Review of Books* he explained, at some length, that there is no way in which the United States can protect itself from continued acts of terrorism. The reason is as simple as that the American people do not live surrounded by a moat, which means that there are 10,000 concentrations of people every

day—in movie theaters, stadiums, parades, tourist centers, college graduation quadrangles—who are targets for terrorists; to be sure, terrorists one degree less ambitious than those who brought off the attacks of September 11.

He was right, there is no way we can protect ourselves. He was wrong in predicting that these assaults would ensue. In the most recent issue Mr. Gloom tells us that there will be suicide bombings on American streets. "Count on it."

Well, I'm not going to count on it any more than on Codevilla's forecast for the weeks following September 11, but with that demurral, I am with him on his overall analysis of deficient U.S. strategy. In that first essay, I thought him arresting and persuasive when he wrote that the

personalization of the September massacre was precisely what we needed to do. We did it, to be sure, to Osama bin Laden, but he was never a large enough target. I myself wrote, soon after September 11, that we had a great deal to fear from actually finding and shooting bin Laden, which would have left us theatrically triumphant, queen bee inert in our hand, while the swarm continued its depredations. Something much larger than bin Laden needed decapitation, and I liked also that Codevilla declared that a great deal was to be gained by precisely condemning a real enemy—Saddam Hussein, a head of state—to death. Executing Saddam Hussein in Baghdad would not absolutely eliminate the hive, but the mailed fist would have been felt, and the

consequences of it would still be in the hands of most of the terrorist-minded who think themselves agents of a political ideal.

Codevilla is right that from the beginning we have feared the consequences of living up to our own rhetorical demands. If we truly set out to "declare war" on those who shelter terrorists, let alone dispatch them, we'd be at war all over the place. Call it a world war. We needed a manageable target, and Iraq was it. It is, I think, too late to generate what would have served us so well, strategic marksmanship. Codevilla was right. He usually is. Count on it.



Frank Gaffney

President, Center for Security Policy

ANGELO CODEVILLA'S ESSAY "WHAT War?" dissected with characteristic brilliance the problems with the Bush Administration's response to the attacks of September 11th. The good news is that, since that critique was published several months ago, President Bush and his national security team have corrected some of the policy and strategic defects identified by Codevilla. The bad news is that they have not done so across the board.

First, consider the positive steps: In the months since "What War?" was written, the President's determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power has been formally and repeatedly declared. This decision reflects an appreciation not only that it was a grievous mistake to have allowed the Iraqi despot to remain in power eleven years ago but a belief that he will become a vastly more dangerous foe for the United States and its allies if not toppled forthwith.

Preparations to effect such a change of regime appear to be proceeding, involving military movements, diplomatic consultations, and other measures. This presidential direction reflects a decided departure from the notion that Codevilla has correctly ascribed to successive American governments—namely, that regional stability can only be achieved by preserving the status quo. If President Bush has his way, at least one Arab foe will be taken out before this war is over.

Equally important are the administration's recent pronouncements to the effect that the United States is no longer going to legitimate, work with, and otherwise prop up the so-called "reformers" in the Iranian government. If the President is also serious about helping the people of Iran achieve their liberation, the status quo in the Persian Gulf could be changed beyond recognition—and very much to the advantage of U.S. interests and those of others who cherish freedom.

In the past few months, President Bush has also taken important steps to counter the Arab bait-and-switch aimed at implicating this country in what Codevilla correctly calls "their war"—the long-running and relentless campaign to destroy Israel. By declaring that numerous, systemic political and leadership changes must precede the establishment of a Palestinian state and American recognition of same, Mr. Bush has created a new opportunity to return the focus of America's war back where it belongs.

Finally, there are, in addition to the foregoing, signs that the Saudi Arabians are losing the privileged status they have enjoyed and exploited in Washington over the past few decades. To be sure, this is partly a product of American popular revulsion at: the Saudis' involvement in the September 11 attacks; their lack of cooperation in investigating this and other acts of anti-U.S. terror; their support for suicide bombers in Israel and Wahhabist-sponsored recruitment, indoctrination, and terrorism elsewhere around the globe; the excessive influence exercised by the Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar, the array of former U.S. officials and ambassadors on his payroll and the various subversive political, media, and ostensibly theological organizations they have created in this country over the past four decades; and the House of Saud's repressive, indeed Talibanesque, application of Sharia law against women, non-believers, and U.S. service personnel. Still, the sea-change is palpable and if not reversed will prove to be of enormous strategic import.

While these and similar steps are promising correctives to several of the serious policy defects Professor Codevilla identified a few months back, they will only contribute to a genuine victory in the present war if further actions are taken without delay. These include:

- Equipping, training, funding, and otherwise empowering the Iraqi National Congress to serve as an effective opposition umbrella group in Iraq—an essential ingredient to the liberation of that country and to giving it a chance for peace and stability post-Saddam.
- Providing whatever financial, informational, and material support is needed to help the Iranian people end the theocrats' misrule in Teheran.
- Working closely with non-Wahhabist Muslims in this country and abroad to counter the effects of that sect's virulent anti-American and anti-Western pedagogy and recruitment, while cutting off Saudi support for same.
- Taking the war in appropriate ways to all of our enemies, not just al-Qaeda.
- Complementing other defensive measures at home by building and deploying at once effective protection against ballistic missile attack.

To accomplish any, let alone all, of these prerequisites for victory in the war begun on September 11, the Bush Administration must adopt one of Angelo Codevilla's most trenchant recommendations: It must change not only "longstanding foreign policy priorities and intellectual habits, [but] the people who run U.S. intelligence and diplomacy." Only by staffing the State Department and CIA with individuals who want the President to succeed in the present war—and who are willing to help him do so—is there a chance of avoiding an outcome in which, when it is over, the question will be "What victory?"



Mackubin T. Owens

Professor of Strategy and Force Planning,
U.S. Naval War College

THERE IS LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE IN Angelo Codevilla's series on the terror war with which I would quibble. He is especially on target when he criticizes the whole concept of homeland security. He is also dead right when he formulates in his first installment the four attitudes that traditionally have informed the U.S. approach to the use of force.

The problem with the series is Codevilla's failure to give any consideration to prudence in the development and implementation of policy and strategy. This failure creates an unrelenting negativism that can only end in defeatism. Codevilla's apparent inability to distinguish between the Clinton and Bush administrations when it comes to international relations and the use of force is akin to suggesting in 1861 that there was no difference between the Buchanan and Lincoln administrations.

Indeed, Codevilla puts me in mind of nothing so much as the Radical Republicans who harried Lincoln throughout the Civil War. Eschewing prudence and ignoring the political conditions that Lincoln faced, they constantly criticized him for his timidity. But had they prevailed in forcing their policies on Lincoln, the Union cause most likely would have been lost in 1862.

We praise Lincoln for his prudence in navigating the minefields of American politics during the Civil War. President Bush deserves the same consideration. In accordance with the dictates of prudence, he, like Lincoln, has skillfully modified his policy in order to adapt to changing circumstances. This is not insignificant.

In fact, only a blind man could fail to note the substantial differences between the Bush and Clinton Administrations. Bush's State of the Union speech laid out a new foreign policy. The Bush Administration now has a declared policy

of regime change and preemption. And perhaps most significantly, President Bush, having "given peace a chance" in the Middle East, now essentially has thrown the weight of the United States behind Israel. In other words, President Bush has begun to implement all the policies that Codevilla advocated in his first article, albeit not as quickly as the good professor would like.

But that's the point. For political reasons, President Bush was not able to effect these changes immediately any more than Lincoln was able to proclaim emancipation in 1861. Such a step surely would have led to the Union's loss of Kentucky and Missouri—and possibly even Maryland. The political cost of precipitous action to President Bush likewise would have been high.

I don't think I need to remind Codevilla that the essence of prudence is the ability to adapt the universal principle to particular circumstances. The right policy, as Codevilla argues, is to effect regime changes in states such as Iraq and to abandon the "evenhanded" approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute. But prudence dictates when and how the policy is to be implemented, which in turn depends a great deal on the circumstances.

For instance, Codevilla decries the fact that we have not yet attacked Iraq. But he must know that current conditions, mostly having to do with weather, climate, and the "tyranny of distance," do not favor military action for a few more months. Precipitous action in the gulf would be as risky as an Allied attempt to invade Europe would have been in 1942 or 1943.

An insistence upon rapid action also ignores the greatest military advantage the United States possesses—dominance of the world's "commons," viz., the sea, space, and air. This advantage means that the United States does not have to strike rapidly. We can bide our time until conditions are optimal. We don't need to risk precipitous action.

Codevilla also ignores some other points. To begin with, he seems adamant that there is a single response to terrorism. But as the Prussian "philosopher of war" Carl von Clausewitz wrote over a century and a half ago, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive." But it is also the most difficult because the answer ultimately depends on the interaction of the belligerents. Since both sides can adapt and change, the kind of war we will be fighting will not necessarily remain constant but will be mutable and may change as conditions change.

Finally, Codevilla seems to believe that his

proposals will assure a final victory. But surely he is familiar with what Clausewitz had to say about the finality of war: "...even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date."

Codevilla is fond of citing Machiavelli. Perhaps, in the political context of a democratic republic, he should think more in terms of Aristotle. The issue is not the right policy, but when it is prudent to implement it.



Norman Podhoretz
Senior Fellow, the Hudson Institute, and
Editor-at-Large, Commentary

ANGELO CODEVILLA'S CRITIQUE OF THE American government's response to the attacks of September 11 is the most intellectually formidable of any I have seen. There is no disagreeing with much of what he says about the weaknesses of the CIA and the FBI; about some of the methods by which the administration has thus far been trying to make us more secure; and about the confusion that has resulted from its original misconceptions regarding the nature of the Arab regimes and the war they have been waging against Israel.

Yet in Codevilla's own opinion, even if the CIA and the FBI were perfect, we would still remain vulnerable to terrorist assault. "There will surely be more attacks, and of increasing seriousness," Codevilla assures us, including "suicide bombings on American streets."

Yes; and yet, as of late July, none of this has (thank God) materialized. It is a great puzzle, and despite much strenuous lucubration I have been unable to come up with a persuasive explanation. Perhaps, then, for all the missteps our government has taken in this area, it has been doing something right. Perhaps enough terrorist "sleepers" in the United States have been arrested to frustrate their immediate designs. And perhaps the grilling of all those prisoners in Guantanamo has yielded information that has further hampered such designs.

But Codevilla not only ridicules the Bush Administration's "homeland security" measures as ineffective; he also casts a cold eye on its conduct of the war abroad. In his judgment, the campaign in Afghanistan has taken on the wrong enemy in the wrong place for the wrong reasons and by the wrong means.

Here again, however, even granting some of his criticisms, perhaps this campaign actually has disrupted the terrorist network, and perhaps

those daisy cutters have sufficiently frightened the state sponsors of terrorism to induce second thoughts about the desirability of other operations that were in the offing. The terrorist dog that has not (yet!) barked would strongly suggest that this indeed is what has been accomplished by the pursuit of al-Qaeda and the toppling of the Taliban.

I am wholeheartedly with Codevilla when he asserts that we ought to "kill" the regimes in Iraq, Syria, and the PLO, which together "are the effective cause of global terrorism" (though I cannot fathom why he omits Iran and its satellite Lebanon from this list or, for that matter, our putative "friends" Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both of whom have incited and financed Palestinian suicide bombing). I am with him, too, when he adds that we should destroy these regimes "as quickly as possible" by capturing their leaders and then subjecting them to punishments ranging from execution to imprisonment to banishment from public life—just as we did with the Nazis.

But I part company with Codevilla entirely when he tells us that in the highly unlikely event that we were to do all this, our best course would then be to pack up and go home. So long as the successor regimes do not make war on us, he declares, it is none of our business how they govern themselves. The "kind of political reconstruction we performed in Germany and Japan" is out because "what happens in Iraq is simply not as important to us as the internal developments of Germany and Japan were."

Yet Codevilla never explains why the character of the successor regimes in Iraq, Syria, and the Palestinian Authority would be of no great concern to the United States. In any case, I strongly disagree with his view. I would remind Codevilla of his own observation that the Middle East as it exists today was created not by Allah but by the West after the First World War. From this much else follows along with our right to get rid of a bunch of murderers and thugs who have now turned on us.

Indeed, as against Codevilla, I would argue that, having helped these criminals assume and keep power, we now also have a right and a responsibility to leave behind a better system. And by "better" I, unlike Codevilla, mean more than merely a group of regimes that will be afraid to threaten us again. I mean a system that will at least contain the potentiality for an evolution toward democracy and economic health. If necessary, we should ensure that this happens precisely the way we did in Germany and Japan: through temporary imperial control that would clear enough political space for the sprouting of indigenous alternatives.

Codevilla is convinced that even if so grand an ambition were attainable, the American peo-

ple are unsuited to pursuing it. Well, my sense of things is that most of us now yearn for the nation to perform the great and glorious deeds of which, time and again, it has proved itself capable.

As for George W. Bush, Codevilla thinks that all he wants is to maintain the status quo. But to believe this requires brushing off the Bush Doctrine as first enunciated in the President's great speech of September 20, 2001 and then fleshed out in three subsequent addresses. In these statements, Bush repudiated moral relativism; officially adopted an understanding of terrorism as dependent upon states that must be held accountable for sponsoring it; asserted a lawful determination to launch a preemptive attack on Iraq (and any other countries that seek to equip terrorists with weapons of mass destruction); and at long last placed Israel's war against terrorism into the context of our own.

Taken seriously, those four speeches undermine much of Codevilla's account. But what is more important, for all the mistakes the President may have committed, and even if his actions are bound to fall short of his promises, Bush's formal statements are infused with so much force of their own that not all the Colin Powells in all the chancelleries of the world can in the long run fully succeed in denying them their due.



David Tucker

Associate Professor of Defense Analysis,
Naval Postgraduate School

ANGELO CODEVILLA SAYS THAT THE current war on terrorism consists of homeland security, more intelligence, and bringing al-Qaeda to justice. This war is a failure in his view because homeland security is silly, impotent, and counterproductive; more intelligence, an impossibility; and bringing al-Qaeda to justice, misconceived and a diversion. The war on terrorism should be, according to Codevilla, the destruction of Iraq, Syria, and the Palestinian Authority and the hanging of every member of the ruling parties of those states, which "are the effective cause of global terrorism." This mayhem is necessary in order to achieve what Codevilla believes should be the objective of the war: "Americans . . . living a quiet and peaceable life, if possible less troubled by the troubles . . . of the world, even freer from searches and sirens . . . than on September 10."

Codevilla is a tough guy. But he is wrong about the current war and wrong in his own prescriptions.

First, the current war. Codevilla's criticism of homeland security and intelligence (the human

component of which he has misunderstood for years) can be dismissed out of hand. His argument amounts to saying that they are no good because they are not perfect. No one claims they are. No one believes that "passive anti-terrorism" suffices. That something is not sufficient does not mean that it is not necessary. At great length, Codevilla smashes a straw man. His claim that going after al-Qaeda is a diversion rests on the assumption that terrorist organizations are just fronts for state intelligence services. They are not. They gain from the assistance of such services as states benefit from the actions of terrorists, but terrorist organizations arise and exist independently of state support. Consider one example: contrary to what Codevilla implies, terrorists made suicide bombing an effective weapon against the United States long before Iraq and others started giving martyr bonuses to the bombers' families. Another example: Codevilla says that the use by terrorists of stolen identities is a mark of support by major league intelligence services. Are the Iraqis responsible for the current problem of identity theft in the United States? Are they responsible for the acquisition around the world on a daily basis of passports and visas through bribery? The terrorists opened bank accounts with phony social security numbers that no one bothered to check. As it would be self-defeating to ignore the aid provided to terrorists by states, so it is self-defeating to ignore the autonomous capabilities of violent clandestine organizations. Codevilla misunderstands and underestimates our enemies.

What of his prescriptions? Without the bombast, Codevilla's objectives are banal: peace and the domestic security status quo ante. The latter is unattainable. If there were no terrorists, others would still seek to exploit our vulnerabilities at home. Chinese military officers have described how to do this in their writings. Instead of longing for some imagined past, it would be better, in light of our fundamental principles, to think seriously about the changes we might make.

Codevilla believes this unnecessary because he proposes to destroy those abroad who would threaten us at home. But we will not be able to stop with Iraq, Syria, and the Palestinian Authority. What about Iran? Codevilla is oddly silent about the Islamic republic, although it has provided more support to terrorists than either Iraq or Syria. What about China? Enemies are endless and so, on Codevilla's argument, will be our regime destroying wars. Is endless warmaking compatible with his objective of "Americans . . . living a quiet and peaceable life"? Why will those we attack not attack us at home with terrorism? Worse, will not our endless warfare and slaughtering and hanging abroad inevitably and adversely affect our republican way of life at home?

Codevilla apparently thinks his plan will work either because we will slaughter enemies faster than our slaughtering makes new ones or because our strutting will cow our enemies. He is proposing attrition warfare without regard for either the character of the enemy we face or the domestic and international politics in which we must operate. Codevilla epitomizes the worst of narrow conventional military thinking made, if possible, even worse in his case because shorn of the restraint that comes from responsibility.

Conservatives and conservative publications should beware of tough-guy posturing. In this case, extremism in the defense of liberty is a vice and moderation in the pursuit of justice would be a virtue.



Angelo M. Codevilla responds:

IN THREE ARTICLES OVER THE PAST YEAR amounting to some 15,000 words, I applied the classical notion of victory—is there any other that fits the word?—to the "War on Terrorism." The gist of the articles is that victory means having your own kind of peace, that in our case it means not having to worry about terrorist attacks or suffering "security measures"; that we can achieve this only by undoing the regimes that embody terrorist causes; and that the Bush team, rhetoric aside, is longer on domestic police measures than on countering hostile regimes.

The *Claremont Review of Books* asked five prominent persons to correct and amplify both the concept and my application of it. None of the brief comments claims that we have victory, or that it is in sight, or says anything about what it would look like. Three try to square their "support of the president" with lack of victory by expressing confidence, to one degree or another, that Mr. Bush will somehow produce victory in the future. One is wroth that I think ill of official policy, indeed that I dare to think of victory at all. Another regrets the lack of intellectual focus that is a precondition of victory. Nevertheless, each points to some substantive issues concerning the "war," on which I will remark.

Norman Podhoretz admits in principle the validity of my criticisms of the post-September 11 U.S. policy, and then asks whether *maybe* the fact that certain events have not yet happened means that my criticisms *may be* invalid. If Podhoretz, a master of argument, thought it possible to make a stronger attack on criticisms he would prefer were invalid, he would have made it. And in fact Podhoretz disagrees with me forthrightly on the important issue of whether the U.S. government ought to take responsibility for the

internal affairs of defeated enemies.

Frank Gaffney admits the validity of my criticisms and then argues that since my articles were written, President Bush *has begun to do* the things that I consider necessary for victory. He concludes with a list of other things that the president *must* do, lest my criticisms be restored to full validity. This is good Washington hortatory form. Gaffney does not mistake words, or even beginnings, for real policy—much less results. He is less sure that the president will carry through with what he has begun, much less with what he has not begun, than that he *had better* do as Codevilla and Gaffney prescribe. But does victory amount to following a set of policy prescriptions?

Mackubin Owens, however, seems to mistake rhetoric for policy. Whereas Frank Gaffney says that the president *must* mean what he says, Owens seems to believe that what the President says amounts to actions *already successfully carried to* term. For him, the fact that the Bush team has not yet done the things that bring victory is a sign of moderation and prudence. Hence, Owens raises a question worth pondering: In war, what is prudence?

David Tucker is outraged that anyone should think that such a victory, a life as safe as that before September 11, were possible. There are too many enemies, we are too vulnerable, and too many people at home and abroad (“the domestic and international politics in which we must operate”) don’t want it. Yes, we must oppose our foreign enemies, but moderately—meaning that we should not think of eliminating them. And we must “think seriously about the changes we must make,” presumably to our own way of life. Recall that I began my first essay by invoking Phil Gramm’s practical definition of victory and defeat: “I don’t want to change the way I live. I want to change the way they live.” Tucker disagrees diametrically. He directs animus against those who would challenge the wisdom of “responsible officials” who share his views. He specifically associates his judgment with those of the U.S. intelligence services. Instructive choice.

William F. Buckley, Jr. has been more correct about more things than any person alive. His minor point, that I predict gloomy doom, is half correct. I have written that the Bush Administration’s current “war” policies naturally lead to bad results. Mismanaged wars usually do. In the 1960s, not even the gloomiest analyses of U.S. policy in Vietnam forecast the changes in American society that it would engender. And at the time, no one was proposing the kinds of across-the-board degradations of American life that today are the alternative to victory. Buckley’s major point—entirely correct—is that this war, like all wars, requires choosing a military target such that killing it yields the war’s aims. That is

my point as well. But Buckley adds that the time for such “strategic marksmanship” is past. He’s gloomier. But who’s right?

Nation-Building?

NORMAN PODHORETZ’S COMMENT continues a conversation begun a decade ago on the first anniversary of the Gulf War when, as editor of *Commentary*, he published a controversial article of mine, “Magnificent, But Was It War?” Podhoretz—barely—let me argue that although U.S. troops had won the battle of Kuwait, the U.S. government had lost the Gulf War. Expelling Saddam from Kuwait, I argued, had been the wrong objective. Because Saddam’s presence in Kuwait was but a symptom of the problem—a successful anti-American regime—getting him out of Kuwait would give us brief symptomatic relief only. Podhoretz disagreed. Substitute “terrorist” for “Iraqi regime,” and his comment now is his argument a decade ago: “perhaps this campaign actually *has* disrupted the [Iraqi regime,] and perhaps those daisy cutters *have* sufficiently frightened [the Iraqi regime] to induce second thoughts about the desirability of other operations that were in the offing.” By weakening Saddam’s regime, Bush the Elder had effectively fixed the problem itself. I argued that weakened though Saddam was, he would parlay his natural geographic advantage and the fact of his very survival into a strategy for the deliberate, long-term propagation of anti-American causes in the region. Those causes now dominate the region.

So, protestations of faith in official policy aside, Podhoretz now agrees with me that we ought to kill the regimes that embody those causes—more regimes than I proposed. He notes Bush the Younger’s “great speech of September 20, 2001,” and that, “taken seriously,” this and other speeches undermine my criticism of the war. Podhoretz would *prefer* to take the speeches seriously. But he does not take them much more seriously than I do.

Podhoretz wants to go further than Bush, and further than I proposed or propose to go. Forthrightly, he argues for establishing in Iraq (and, logically, elsewhere as well) “temporary imperial control that would clear enough political space for sprouting of indigenous alternatives.” And he hopes that those alternatives would involve “democracy and economic health.” In this he joins a respectable group ranging from historian Paul Johnson to *The Washington Post* who recognize now that the U.S. decision in the 1950s to chase Franco-British imperialism from the Middle East opened Pandora’s box. They agree with me that “the West, not Allah,” thus created today’s Middle East and put it in the

hands of “a bunch of murderers.” They recognize that, left to themselves, the locals are not likely to be decent, prosperous, peaceful, or friendly. In this they are admirably ahead of the State Department and CIA, who continue to be blinded by the mirages that they themselves conjured up three generations ago.

But we cannot undo that wrong. Thanks in part to America, Europe so changed character that it is now part of the problem rather than the solution. Imperialism is a difficult, un-American art. Neither Podhoretz nor I know of any Americans fit for or inclined to imperial service. We are also without any compelling set of teachings to impart that would cancel out the massive damage to local cultures that the “best and the brightest” from our universities wrought when they sold these peoples secular socialism. The rebirth of Germany and Japan occurred because the remnants of Christian Democratic and Taisho democratic culture, respectively, were strong enough. Nevertheless, the Americans almost managed to make Adenauer and Yoshida into discredited puppets. Which is what the next generation of Americans succeeded in doing to Thieu and Ky in Saigon. Today, the fact that Afghanistan’s Hamid Karzai lives surrounded by a praetorian guard of American troops augurs badly for “nation-building” there.

So if we cannot take responsibility for making the peoples of the Middle East into other than what they are, if we cannot make them like us, what can we do? We can earn their respect by killing our enemies. Though we cannot make good regimes, we *can* kill harmful ones. Distinguishing between the relatively harmful and harmless, between the more and less friendly, is the simple beginning of wisdom. Plato grounds the argument of his *Republic* on the observation that dogs do this well. So far however, the U.S. government has killed lots of people whose deaths have not made us safe, and spared the regimes that hate us.

I suggest, and prefer to believe that Podhoretz agrees, that our own intellectual and moral insufficiencies are our main problem in this war. Is it not interesting that the kind of Americans who used to urge deference to the Soviet Union now urge deference to the Islamic world?

What Will It Take?

FRANK GAFFNEY PROPOSES AN IMPRESSIVE list of prescriptions for victory, with which I agree entirely. Some, the Bush team has promised to buy. Others it has not—yet *inshallah*, as they say. But before considering whether victory is the sum of these or any prescriptions, we should note and how difficult they are to implement in the teeth of the elite culture shared by

the Bush team.

Regime change. Recall that during the Cold War only discredited right-wingers such as Ronald Reagan and a minority of his advisers braved the scorn of “the best and the brightest” (including most of the two Bush teams) by suggesting that the Soviet regime could not be housebroken, much less reformed, and that U.S. policy should aim at its death. Indeed, few in Washington or academe even know what the word “regime” means. After September 11, I called attention to the fact that terrorism is not the aberration of individuals but the product of regimes when I wrote, “It’s the regime, stupid!” But when Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said that our war should aim at undoing several regimes, the Bush team publicly disowned him.

Think of the policies and practices, and of the people who embody them, that would have to be changed to focus on regimes. “Dual Containment” of Iraq and Iran has been in place for a decade. “Peace Processes” vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict—paying the nastiest Arabs not to be so nasty—have been the staple of U.S. policy since before 1967. When we speak of states that finance terrorism, we must include the United States, which funnels millions (while the European Union funnels billions) to the PLO.

Think of the disastrous ideas and of the people who have made careers pushing them. Sure, some officials will deny that they ever espoused them, and climb higher yet on the new wave. Hence it is amusing to see Richard Haver, who in the 1980s, as Bobby Ray Inman’s protégé, championed Saddam Hussein’s moderation and malleability, now touted as the Defense Intelligence Czar in the “war on terrorism.” Had the Inman-Haver line prevailed in U.S. foreign policy, it would have been impossible for Israel to destroy Saddam’s reactor, and Iraq would have become a nuclear power. Such flip-flops can work. But the Bush team’s addiction to people with bad records is a mortgage on good policy.

The Arab bait and switch. Back in 1953, Gamal Abdul Nasser told his officers that he had discovered the secret of success against the West: Don’t attack in uniform with flags flying. Rather, send irregulars. Hail the cause for which they fight—your cause—but disavow any involvement with them. Nasser did not imagine that Western statesmen lacked the raw mental capacity to understand his ploy. Rather, he figured that they were so morally undermined by their commitment to the ideal of the equality of peoples, so morally incapable of fighting for their own interests, that they would go along with the game.

And for half a century, they have. Thus, after Arabs bloodied America on September 11 in behalf of causes supported by all Arab govern-

ments, the U.S. has taken no action against any Arab government. Gaffney rightly notes it as news that President Bush, after supporting the creation of a Palestinian state, after crediting the patently fraudulent “Saudi peace initiative,” after massively restraining Israel, has verbally conditioned the continuation of this attitude on “numerous systemic, political, and leadership changes” in the Palestinian Authority, if not in Saudi Arabia itself. President Bush may have seen through the “bait and switch” intellectually. But the “bait and switch” was never an intellectual problem.

The privileged status of Saudi Arabia. There are signs, writes Gaffney, that the Saudi royal family may be losing its privileged status in Washington, and that it should no longer be confident of exercising vetoes over U.S. policy.



Good. Whence came that status and that veto power? From two of the American elite’s moral shortcomings.

The first is straightforward: Lots of Americans are eager to be bought. By guaranteeing seven-figure incomes to former U.S. ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, the royal family assures itself that current U.S. ambassadors will do what it takes to earn a pension that dwarfs what the U.S. taxpayer will provide. By favorable treatment of oil executives who put pressure on politicians on their behalf, the royal family buys itself a potent lobby. Awareness that the average American might begin paying attention to such routine corruption accounts for the signs that Gaffney mentions.

The second is less evident, more significant, and more difficult to eradicate. How did the Saudi royal family get the money with which it propitiates so many Americans? Lots of oil comes from Saudi Arabia. But is it written in the stars that the oil money should go to the royal family? If the money were to go exclusively to those who found the oil, who provide the expertise, the labor, and the equipment to get it out of the ground and into the world’s gas tanks, or who defend the fields, very few Arabs—and no Saudi royals at all—would get anything. They get what they get because Western elites think they have

a right to it, because the elites believe that all peoples are naturally sovereign over the ground they occupy, and because Westerners know no grounds for distinguishing legitimate regimes from robber bands. This peculiar ideology is neither self-evident nor compelled by intellectual rigor. Until 1973, Westerners, not Arabs, decided what “royalties” the royals should get. Having less lucre, these Arabs were unable to finance the terrorism and corruption that have fouled our lives since the 1970s. Paying such sums is symptomatic of the same moral confusion and corruption that made it okay to be bought.

Finally, Gaffney’s premise is that President Bush must live up to his words. Richard Perle recently mused for the record that President Bush, having spoken as he did on September 20 and in his 2002 State of the Union Address, cannot mount the podium of the House of Representatives in 2003 without having begun at least to dismantle the “Axis of Evil.” But taking such actions will not be easy. It will be tempting, certainly to many in his administration, for Bush to announce instead: “No war against Iraq. Long live Saudi stability. Homeland Security forever!”

We can see, then, that victory is more than the sum of the parts that Frank Gaffney has assembled so well. These policies are indeed the body of victory. But to live, that body must have a mind and soul capable of sustaining its parts. Good policies are necessary, but not sufficient. At countless points in any struggle, there must arise temptations to misinterpret or to deviate. One must know why the policies are correct, and have cultivated shame of doing the wrong thing.

Prudence and the Pill

ARISTOTLE DEFINES PRUDENCE AS THE application of means most apt to achieve the good end. I’m sure Mackubin Owens agrees with that. All human actions, indeed, all processes of nature—so teaches Aristotle—are ordered each to its peculiar end. The natural end of war is victory, just as the natural end of farming is produce. Prudence is essential to farming, not for its own sake but so that we may eat the fruits of the field. Prudence is essential in war so that we may live in the safety that is the fruit of victory. Just as we cannot eat prudence instead of corn, prudence cannot shield us from our enemies. The proof of prudence or lack thereof is neither in rushing forward nor in holding back, but in good results.

Owens praises Bush for not having done certain things—yet. But according to the dictionary, and even more according to Aristotle, it makes no sense to pin the label prudence on speaking rather than acting, or for that matter on acting

instead of speaking. Prudence involves good deliberation that leads to good actions. The two must go together, which is why it makes little sense to use the term prudence prospectively.

Much of Owens's comments consist of truisms, e.g., "prudence dictates when and how the policy is implemented, which in turn depends on the circumstances." He applies them to concrete circumstances only once: an invasion of Iraq after September 11, he claims, would have been impractical (and is now impractical) because of "weather, climate, and the tyranny of distance." Prudently, we must ask: Compared to what? Afghanistan?

Last time I looked, Afghanistan was almost as inaccessible as Mongolia or Tibet, whereas Iraq had a sea coast. I am confident that the Naval War College's maps, like mine, show that no point in Afghanistan is closer to any part of the United States or Europe, never mind to our fleet bases, than the farthest point of Iraq is. Iraq is largely flat, whereas Afghanistan is one mountain range after another. As for "weather and climate," the U.S. invaded Afghanistan rather than Iraq precisely at the time when the weather was nicest in Iraq and getting worse in Afghanistan.

Above all, from the standpoint of prudence—remember, it points to results, not action or inaction—invading Afghanistan proved to be imprudent because Afghanistan proved not to be the enemy's "center of gravity" (see Clausewitz). The proof? Even though the military operation was successful, the Bush team (rightly) acted as if the threat of terrorism to Americans was undiminished.

The Best and the Brightest

WHEREAS OWENS DEFENDS THE Bush Administration's hesitancy as part of what he believes is the optimal pursuit of victory, David Tucker praises it because he believes that the pursuit of victory itself is a terrible thing.

Tucker calls my proposals for victory "bombast" and "tough-guy posturing." Does he claim that I would not intend to do the things I propose? Only in that case would the terms apply. Or does Tucker fault me for truly intending to do them? Note that President Bush has endorsed much the same things in his speech of September 20, 2001, and in his State of the Union Address of 2002, but repeatedly makes it clear that he has no plans to do them. Why does Tucker not apply the dictionary definition of "bombast" and "posturing" to that? Answer: Tucker does not object to speaking loudly and carrying a small stick. He really does believe that destroying one's enemies is a bad thing.

This of course was the position of the best

and the brightest. Tucker's arguments against trying for victory recall those of 40 years ago: Osgood and Schelling and McGeorge Bundy and McNamara, not to mention those of the Henry Kissinger of the late 1960s and '70s, and later, Strobe Talbott. "Enemies are endless," and the attempt to secure ourselves through victory means endless war. If we succeed in defeating one set, "others will still seek to exploit our vulnerabilities at home." Besides, peace and security are "unattainable." The real danger to America is "extremist" Americans who are "shorn of the restraint that comes from responsibility" and "epitomize the worst in narrow military thinking." Straight out of McNamara's *In Retrospect*. All this talk of victory is an excuse for avoiding "thinking seriously about changes we might make" in our own way of life. Straight out of



the fountainhead of 1960s anti-Americanism, William Appleman Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*.

Tucker also has the U.S. intelligence community on his side. Full disclosure on my part: Between 1977 and 1985, my job was to oversee the budget and quality of operations of the U.S. intelligence community on behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. During painfully detailed reviews of operations, analyses, post-mortems, proposals, and even more painful involvement in internal controversies at the highest levels, after having written volumes of classified documents, including (largely) the 1980 transition report for William Casey and Ronald Reagan, I came to highly critical conclusions about the agencies' understanding of their craft. In the open literature, I published *Informing Statecraft* (McMillan, 1992). I am the principal author of the eight-volume series *Intelligence Requirements of the 1980s* (R. Godson, editor) as well as of many articles. Two directors of Central Intelligence have asked me to help senior officials think through their problems, and I have taught courses in intelligence classified at the Codeword level.

Tucker accuses me of "saying they are no good because they are not perfect." In fact, I think U.S. human intelligence is almost per-

fectly incompetent.

What other term should we apply to the following record? Whenever we have gotten windfalls of information about our agent networks in key countries, it has turned out that all or nearly all were actually working for hostile intelligence services and feeding us information cooked to their masters' tastes. In the case of Cuba, it was 100%. In the case of East Germany, it was all but three. In the case of the Soviet Union, Aldrich Ames and Robert Hansson turned over the names of all Russians who were working for us and, since they were in charge of vetting all new recruits, made sure that we accepted as real agents every single courier of disinformation that the KGB sent our way.

The causes of this gullibility are less the occasional traitor than faults of the system. First, neither in the CIA nor in the FBI is the quality control function of counter-intelligence independent. It's as if Arthur Andersen were actually a subsidiary of Enron. Second, CIA and FBI officials have too often been rewarded for telling higher-ups what they want to hear.

The agencies' performance in the war on terrorism has been all too predictable. Lacking sources of their own, they depend on Arab liaison services. CIA sources boasted to *Time* magazine that America now gets much of its strategic information about "al-Qaeda" and the September 11 conspiracy from one Muhammed Haymar Zammar, who, the Syrian General Security directorate tells us, it has in prison. We do not know the relationship between Syria and Mr. Zammar, because Americans are not allowed to see him. CIA submits written questions to the Syrian government, which then gives us what it claims are Mr. Zammar's answers. CIA expresses satisfaction because the Syrians may be torturing those answers out of Zammar. What reason does the CIA have to believe that those answers are coming from Zammar at all, rather than from meetings of Syrian and other Arab officials who bat around the question: What do we want the Americans to think today?

It so happens that what the Arab governments want the U.S. government to think—namely that terrorism is the spontaneous reaction of good people throughout the mid-East to scandalously pro-Jewish U.S. policy, that the U.S. government has at least as much to fear from its own "extremists" as it does from Arabs, and that as Tucker put it, "terrorist organizations arise and exist independent of state support"—is precisely what much of the U.S. government wants to hear. Consider the events of July 4, 2002, when, after an Egyptian carried out a suicide mass shooting of Israelis and Americans at Los Angeles International airport, the FBI spokesman declared: "There is nothing

to indicate terrorism.”

Our intelligence agencies love “Homeland Defense.” Under its umbrella, they get budgets, promotions, and, so far, a free pass not to worry about how they treat ordinary Americans. There is no reason, however, for the rest of us to agree.

Strategic Marksmanship

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR. ELSEWHERE has written wisely and passionately on the stupidity of the U.S. government reacting to terrorism by Arabs for Arab causes by acting as if each and every human being was as likely to be a terrorist as any other human being. Buckley knows that this kind of “Homeland Security” is the alternative to victory, and that it is a ruinous alternative. Also, more clearly than professional students of war, Buckley absorbed the common sense of Clausewitz’s insight that seriousness in war—or more correctly, war as opposed to mere violence—means striking at the enemy’s “center of gravity,” that set of persons or things that, if knocked over, will rid you of your problem. Thus do ordinary soldiers shoot at the other side’s officers.

Herein, Buckley writes that, for the reasons I have explained, Iraq’s Ba’athist regime is the center of gravity of terrorism. But why is it too late to generate strategic marksmanship? Granted, such things are better done sooner than later, but why not later rather than not at all? The choice is perpetual.

The opposite of strategic marksmanship, the opposite of targeting the leaders of foreign governments, is for the U.S. government to make life harder, less full of confidence, for Americans at home and ultimately to discredit itself as well

as those who support it.

Only the dullest believe that the “security measures” that now inconvenience and humiliate grandmothers, Medal of Honor winners, and Al Gore (he was searched at an airport recently) reflect the capacity of the U.S. government to protect us. People know in their bones that they reflect incompetence. Buckley, along with Podhoretz, thinks it significant that no major terrorist blow has struck us since the anthrax attacks that shut down the Capitol in October—only the suicide shooting at LAX on July 4. But clearly the only reason why not worse has happened is that no one has tried. If they had, none of the security measures would have stopped them. As I pointed out in my original article, Israel’s pervasive security measures had only the tiniest effect on the suicide bombing campaign. But the cost of failed security measures—in Israel, America, or anywhere else—goes far beyond lives lost and property damaged.

Insecurity, lack of confidence in those in charge—these are poison for economic life. Economies run on confidence. The economic boom that ended the Great Depression began only after it became clear that the Axis was going to be defeated. Ronald Reagan built the U.S. economy quite as much by giving the impression that America could not be messed with as he did with his tax cuts. The boom of the ‘90s followed the impression—bolstered by the Gulf War—that the demise of the Soviet Union meant free rein for the global economy. Such golden dreams are out of the question so long as executives are subjected to identity checks on their way to meetings, investors fear the next news shock, and consumers, whenever they fly, have to walk past troops armed with automatic weapons.

Confidence is even more essential to politics

than to economies. Nothing destroys a people’s confidence in its way of life more surely than the impression that the people-in-charge are incompetent, and nothing earns that impression more surely than a government’s failure to provide safety. That is why the U.S. government’s failure to win (in the true sense of the word) the war on terrorism, failure to restore “a quiet and peaceable life,” would have consequences for America far worse than the ones that befell when “the best and the brightest” botched the Vietnam War.

Bad as that war’s consequences were for America as a whole, however, they were worse for American conservatives. The war was not their doing. This was a Liberals’ war, run by Liberals, who regarded Barry Goldwater and William F. Buckley, Jr., as more reprehensible than Ho Chi Minh. Moreover, those who ran the war engendered changes in American society that were anathema to conservatives. Nevertheless, a misguided patriotism moved conservatives to “support the president” when others abandoned him. Thus conservatives were left holding the bag for the defeat. Successive generations learn that the whole mess was due, as Jimmy Carter put it, to an “inordinate fear of Communism,” and that “through defeat we found our way back to our own values.”

The “war on terrorism” is not the doing of conservatives. Its causes—indulgence of Third Worldism in general and of Arab tyrannies in particular, and most particularly the failure to finish the Gulf War—are things that conservatives from Buckley to Robert Bartley unanimously inveighed against. Nor is the “war on terrorism” being waged as conservatives would like. It would be a raw deal if conservatives, following their natural inclination to “support the president,” were left holding the bag for yet another botched war.



HAIL TO THE CHIEF

John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court, by R. Kent Newmyer.
Louisiana State University Press, 511 pages, \$39.95

ALTHOUGH HONORED BY ALL AS THE Great Chief Justice, and by many as the last Founding Father, John Marshall has only recently begun to receive his due from biographers. For nearly a century following his death in 1835, the most important source of information about Marshall, other than his own writings, was the moving tribute penned by his longtime colleague, Joseph Story. Eighty years would pass before the first substantial biography appeared — *The Life of John Marshall* by Albert J. Beveridge (four vols., 1916-1920), which dwarfs in *avoiirdupois*, if not enthusiasm, all other compositions on the subject.

Beveridge's *Life* is an appealing, spirited hagiography that sought to do for Marshall what Marshall did for George Washington. Marshall's *The Life of George Washington*, however, is that rare thing, a great book written by one great man about another great man. It is at once a riveting narrative of the Revolutionary War and Washington's genius as a military commander and political leader; a compelling appraisal of the Confederation's shortcomings, the necessity of Union, and Washington's indispensability to its formation; an account of Washington's presidential statesmanship; and, finally, a peerless assessment of his legacy and character. Taken all in all, it is a treatise on republican virtue and statesmanship, written by one who understood and possessed those traits, about another who embodied them as no one else.

Measured against this standard, Beveridge almost inevitably had to come up short. Marshall emerges from his pages as a man for all seasons, but mostly Beveridge's own: Marshall was great because he seems to have anticipated the very ideas and reforms Beveridge thought useful to 20th century America. In the end, for all its charm and insight, the work reveals more about its author and his era than it does about its subject. Even so, Beveridge cast a giant shadow, which explains in part why 80 more years would pass before another major biography was ventured, Jean Edward Smith's *John Marshall: Definer of a Nation* (1996).

Legal commentary on Marshall and his Court abounds, which sifts and re-sifts the implications of the great cases, especially *Marbury v. Madison*, *Gibbons v. Ogden*, and *McCulloch v. Maryland*.

Significantly, the most thoughtful evaluations of Marshall have come from political scientists rather than lawyers. In a class by itself is Robert K. Faulkner's *The Jurisprudence of John Marshall* (1968), which evaluates Marshall's thought and deeds in the light shed by the grand tradition of classical political philosophy. It is a brilliant work, in every respect worthy of its subject.

We are now witnessing a new burst of scholarly interest in the great Chief Justice. In the past few years alone, in addition to the Smith biography, two new books have come forth on Marshall's opinions and his stewardship of the Supreme Court, and others are in the works. The definitive edition of the *Marshall Papers* proceeds apace (10 volumes and counting). And now we have legal historian R. Kent Newmyer's fine intellectual biography. At last, scholars are paying a debt long overdue.

Although Marshall's greatness is everywhere acknowledged, he is not always honored for the right reasons. In our own time, his authority is commonly invoked, especially by legal writers, to justify expansion of judicial power in ways that would have horrified Marshall, the original originalist. A typically modern argument will begin, of course, with *Marbury*, going on to cite diverse other Marshall dicta (e.g., "We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding."), by way of prelude to a justification of the Supreme Court's exclusive franchise on constitutional interpretation. Throw in some loose talk about the Constitution as the repository of democratic "ideals" or "aspirations," and what you get is John Marshall reborn as William Brennan.

In the late 1960s, when the Warren Court was in full swing, one enthusiast at a Yale Law School conference proceeded along these lines, concluding that the combined effect of *Marbury*, *McCulloch*, and the 14th Amendment essentially conveyed a "blank check" to the Supreme Court. The late Alexander M. Bickel, who wrote about the Court with care, moderation, and eloquence, skewered the assertion with a simple but deftly chosen illustration. Let's see how this sounds, he responded, transposing the unfortunate phrase into Marshall's famous dictum: "We must never forget that it is a blank check we are expounding."

Few statements, and none so short, have so perfectly punctured the pretensions of judicial

supremacy. Bickel, alas, is gone now, and the Blank Check theory of the Constitution lives on in what is called the "living Constitution." It is not clear whether proponents of this idea actually believe Marshall would subscribe to their theory, or whether they merely cite dicta that lend apparent support to their agenda. In any event, serious students of the subject know better. As Christopher Wolfe and Robert Lowry Clinton have demonstrated beyond cavil, neither *Marbury* nor any other arrow in Marshall's quiver can justly be deployed to support modern presumptions about judicial power.

The modern practice of judicial review has a different, and later, provenance, one very much at odds with Marshall's jurisprudence. The *locus classicus* is *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, which simultaneously rejected the natural rights foundation of the Constitution and introduced substantive due process as a standard of review. Although the holding of *Dred Scott* fell into immediate disrepute in virtue of Abraham Lincoln's critique and the verdict of the Civil War, its doctrines lived on, put to extraneous use by the post-Civil War Court. Despite ritual condemnations of judicial invalidation of legislative judgments on economic regulation, modern advocates of judicial power have reinvented substantive due process under numerous other guises. Their goals are to transform the Bill of Rights into a charter of autonomous individualism, and the Supreme Court into what Judge John T. Noonan once called "a floating constitutional convention" empowered to create "fundamental" rights. Modern constitutionalism is what you get when Roger Taney meets Lawrence Tribe and Ronald Dworkin.

ALTHOUGH MISCHIEVOUS INTERPRETATIONS of Marshall's opinions are not the particular object of his concern, it is clear on Professor Newmyer's showing that Marshall is no adept of the "living Constitution." The Constitution in Marshall's hands was certainly a capacious instrument whose provisions were meant to accommodate an infinite variety of changing circumstance. But it was hardly the protean document conjured by modern interpreters, who believe the Constitution ought to resonate to what Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. called "the felt necessities" of the times. Marshall's generous reading of

constitutional language is properly celebrated, but his motives were far more complex than those ascribed to him by critics whose horizon is defined and limited by positive law.

Marshall's opinions in the grand cases are not merely learned glosses on positive law (although they are that), but elegant lectures, intended for a broader audience, on the principles and practice of republican government. Those principles were made immanent in the Constitution, but their proper interpretation required a prior understanding of the Constitution's origins and justification. Newmyer's Marshall, firmly anchored in the natural rights legacy of John Locke, takes seriously the obligation of government to secure rights already inherent in man's nature. Marshall also believed that the Court bore a moral obligation to construe the Constitution in accordance with the intent of its framers. He read certain provisions broadly, and others narrowly, because he believed that is what the framers intended.

Professor Newmyer is refreshingly free of cant and, like his subject, judicious and balanced in his assessments. He writes gracefully, often eloquently, taking pains to avoid the tendentious legal parsing that plagues the law reviews. His technical legal proficiency is nevertheless apparent on every page. He guides the reader like a skilled storyteller through often recondite disputes, making them come alive, clarifying the legal issues, and confirming at every turn Marshall's mastery of both fine detail and grand concept. He sets the stage by showing how Marshall's early experience—his close association with Washington during the War for Independence, his first-hand experience with the chaos of the Confederation, his familiarity with the deliberations at the Philadelphia Convention, his advocacy as a delegate to Virginia's ratifying convention, his diplomatic and administrative activities under John Adams—framed his thinking before he was named to the Court.

From there, Newmyer goes on to correct, gently and persuasively, a major misimpression about Marshall's nationalism that persists in the literature. Enthusiasts of every stripe deploy Marshall to their own uses. Those with small affection for federalism invoke his dicta as brickbats against the states; those inclined toward state prerogatives cite many of the same dicta to suggest that the Chief Justice betrayed the constitutional settlement of 1787. On Newmyer's showing, Marshall's nationalism fits neither stereotype. It was balanced, subtle, and prudent, perfectly capturing Madison's sense that the Constitution was "neither wholly federal nor wholly national."

On this point, Marshall saw before anyone else (and, it could be argued, better than Madison himself) the full implications of what was

wrought at Philadelphia. And he took it upon himself to instruct the nation, where it was possible to do so in relevant cases, about America's uniquely constituted federal system. The modern court has said that the 10th Amendment is merely declaratory, but of course that raises the question: Declaratory of *what*? In Marshall's view, it certainly did not declare the states-rights' understanding of John C. Calhoun; but even the author of *McCulloch* would be shocked by the unqualified nationalism that is nowadays said to be justified by his opinion.



Professor Newmyer also shows Marshall's assiduous labors to preserve the principles of 1776 and 1787—and how masterfully he wove those principles into his opinions for the Court on subject after subject. He wove them as well into the minds of his judicial colleagues, at least in the pre-Jackson era, and into the foundations of the early Supreme Court itself. When Marshall assumed the Chief Justiceship, the Supreme Court was, at best, an inchoate institution, a co-equal branch in theory but a poor relation in fact. It lacked power, esteem, or even much in the way of institutional definition. Two of his predecessors had resigned to pursue more rewarding activity, and vacancies were difficult to fill. Its docket was almost laughably sparse, consisting of perhaps half-a-dozen cases per year. By the time the Chief Justice died in 1835, the Court's docket was crowded with numerous cases of great import, its place in the constitutional firmament had been fixed, its reputation and influence fully secured.

During those 34 years, Marshall wrote a majority of the court's opinions, including all those in the great cases. Until the last years of his tenure, virtually all were unanimous verdicts. His mastery of fine points of law was equaled by his mastery of constitutional principle, but both in turn were exceeded by his mastery of men. Per-

suading six other lawyers to agree on anything is a near-impossible task; persuading six colleagues on the Supreme Court to agree so often on so many issues of signal importance requires statesmanship of the highest order. That Marshall was able to accomplish that feat, year after year, despite changing membership on the Court and despite some of the bitterest partisan contention the nation has ever seen, testifies to his political and intellectual genius.

We will never know, of course, what might have happened had Marshall not been at the helm of the Court. We do not know, but we can guess, and Newmyer's chapter, "Marshall, Jefferson, and the Rise of the Supreme Court," hints at some likely alternatives. In a masterpiece of concision, Newmyer brings together in 60-odd pages what others have taken whole books to delineate with less effect. Here you will find a legally precise and thoroughly balanced discussion of the Jefferson-Marshall wars. The drama of their several major legal encounters ranks with the most important and contentious in American history. Three times within the space of four years, these two giants went toe-to-toe: on the *Marbury* question; on the question of Justice Samuel Chase's impeachment; and on the definition of treason in the trial of Aaron Burr. This is law writ large, and had any of the questions been resolved other than as they were, the history of the United States might have turned out quite differently.

Thomas Jefferson was armed with ferocious determination, the powers of the chief magistracy, and large majorities in both houses of Congress. Marshall's determination equaled Jefferson's, but his only weapons were a weak and still undefined Court and the power of his pen. The stories are too long and too complicated to repeat here, but suffice it to say that after the dust had settled, the score stood at Marshall 3, Jefferson 0. These extraordinary cases involved constitutional questions of the first magnitude, on which the relevant law was unclear, contradictory, or non-existent, and they were animated by personal rivalry and political passion. In the event, their happy resolution owes everything to the Chief Justice's extraordinary statesmanship, which succeeded in controlling events at every critical turn. If you knew about John Marshall only what you learned from any one of these cases, you would be convinced that he was a man of intellectual genius and noble character. Knowing of all three, and of his other dazzling accomplishments besides, you could conclude only that he was one of the greatest men ever to spring from our soil. We owe Professor Newmyer our gratitude for reminding us, once again, of that fact.

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Book Review by Steven F. Hayward

THE MAKING OF LBJ

The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, by Robert A. Caro.
Alfred A. Knopf, 1167 pages, \$35



“ALL THROUGH LYNDON JOHNSON’S political life,” Robert Caro writes near the end of this magisterial volume covering Lyndon Johnson’s Senate years (1949-1960), “there had been striking evidence not only of compassion but of something that could make compassion meaningful: signs of a most unusual capacity, a very rare gift, for using the powers of government to help the downtrodden and the dispossessed.”

There, in one sentence, is both what is wrong with Johnson and what is wrong with Caro’s otherwise extraordinary biography, a lifetime project that has now reached its third volume. There is nothing at all “rare” about using the power of government—that is, using other people’s money—to ameliorate the sufferings of Americans. It is the epitome of modern liberalism, and is the defining feature of American politics today—so much so that our current president feels it necessary to define himself as a “compassionate conservative,” which is hard to distinguish from a low-budget liberal.

Johnson’s only “rare gift” was his supreme success at finding new ways to institutionalize the spending of other people’s money. Most of that success came during his presidency, which Caro will treat in future installments. Caro’s first two volumes, *The Path to Power* and *Means of Ascent*, are highly critical of Johnson, offering juicy details about the many loathsome features of his character and behavior. This volume, too, is frank in its description of LBJ as power-hungry, cruel, bigoted, ruthless, deceitful, vain, grasping, and even “immoral.” He urinated in public, raged at and belittled his staff, used racist epithets with abandon, stole elections, and collected prodigious sums of campaign money

in cash (how much of it may have ended up in Johnson’s own pocket Caro does not speculate). And yet the LBJ who emerges from Caro’s pages atones for these sins through his compassion and his skill at making the dysfunctional U.S. Senate work, as Caro supposes the American Founders meant it to work. Despite Johnson’s pettiness, power-seeking, and unvarnished ambition, Caro puts him on a plane nearly equal to Lincoln: “He was to be the President who, above all Presidents save Lincoln, codified compassion, the President who wrote mercy and justice into the statute books by which America was governed.”

To be sure, Johnson’s Senate career presents a spectacle of unparalleled political mastery, worthy of close study. And Caro’s exhaustive researches and fine-grained narrative are a marvel of the biographer’s art. (His book makes you appreciate the smallness of the most recent Senate majority leaders, Tom Daschle and Trent Lott.) Yet Caro’s description of Johnson’s Senate years cannot sustain LBJ on such a high plateau. This may not be an accident or inconsistency, however. Caro’s approach to LBJ, as many critics have observed, is ambiguous, despite the comparisons to Lincoln (which Caro makes more than once).

Some reviewers (Ronald Steel in *The Atlantic*, for example) argue that Caro has difficulty understanding or accepting political power. There is much to this criticism. His majestic tale of Johnson could be a cautionary tale of the hazards of power—the hazards to one’s own soul, and to a nation when too much power is accumulated in the government. The deeper source of Caro’s ambiguity is the intellectual problem LBJ poses for liberals. As civil rights leader Roy Wilkins succinctly put it: “With Johnson, you never quite knew if he was out to lift your heart or your wal-

let.” Caro’s praise and partial admiration for LBJ owes to Caro’s filtering Johnson through a sympathetic liberal lens, portraying LBJ as an agent in the progressive march toward greater “social justice,” a phrase that Caro uses frequently in the expository sections of his narrative.

His attempt to redeem Johnson appears to be part of a quiet trend. Reflecting on the ineptitude of the Carter presidency and the fecklessness of the Clinton presidency has led many liberals to begin reappraising Johnson in a more favorable light. His Great Society delivered more landmark social legislation than even FDR’s New Deal. The disaster of Vietnam and the unrest in the streets in the 1960s, which together fractured the Democratic Party, eclipsed this record for a long time. Yet the judgment John Kenneth Galbraith offered in 1967 is reasserting itself: “Our gains under the Johnson administration on civil rights outweigh our losses on behalf of Marshall Ky.”

That liberals, who distrusted Johnson in the Senate and then hated him in the White House, might come to regard Johnson as their most worthy modern champion is a startling irony. It also presents a huge intellectual problem. Unless it is assumed that “character doesn’t matter,” a way must be found to lessen Johnson’s ugliness. Caro finds it in Johnson’s maneuvering in 1957 to break the hitherto invincible Southern filibuster against civil rights legislation.

JOHNSON ARRIVED IN THE SENATE IN 1949 as a full-throated adherent to the Southern cause. He attacked desegregation and civil rights in his 1948 campaign (in statements he suppressed in the 1960s), and his maiden speech in the Senate was titled “We of the South.” He

immediately fell in with Georgia Senator Richard Russell, the captain of the Southern opposition to all civil rights legislation, and, Caro believes, attended meetings of the Southern Caucus, the regular gathering where Southern Senators would plot strategy. (Johnson also denied this in later years.)

Johnson immediately distinguished himself in the Senate as someone who understood how to accumulate power around him and get things done. Some of these "accomplishments" were dubious at best, such as his Red-baiting attack on Federal Power Commission chairman Leland Olds, providing the model for Joseph McCarthy several years later. Caro records LBJ telling Olds after having engineered the destruction of his career: "Lee, I hope you understand there's nothing personal in this. We're still friends, aren't we? It's only politics, you know."

More significant in Caro's narrative is Johnson's decision to pursue the party leadership post in the Senate, hitherto the graveyard of Senate reputations and careers. Caro's account of Johnson's years as majority leader is superb. No one could read a man—understand his motives, his weaknesses (and therefore how to get his vote)—like Johnson. "If you liked politics," Hubert Humphrey remarked, "it was like sitting at the feet of a giant." Caro's summary judgment is that "Johnson transformed the Senate, pulled a nineteenth-century—indeed, in many respects an eighteenth-century—body into the twentieth century."

Johnson's decision to break with the South and midwife the 1957 Civil Rights Act is portrayed throughout the book as a naked political calculation on Johnson's part. Even with Johnson's already legendary skills at manipulating the Senate, it still seemed like an impossible task. Yet there were many reasons why the political interests fell into line. If LBJ was ever going to have a chance of becoming President, he had to be acceptable to Northern liberals in the Democratic Party—"You got to clean him up on civil rights," in the words of liberal lawyer Joseph Rauh. Southerners were willing to go along because they recognized that Johnson was the only Southerner with a realistic chance to reach the White House, where, Richard Russell assumed, LBJ would protect the interests of the South. Johnson found the lowest common denominator—a weak voting rights bill that Caro himself admits had little effect on black

voting registration in Southern states. From this nakedly cynical and self-serving stratagem Caro makes Johnson into "the greatest champion that the liberal senators . . . had had since, almost a century before, there had been a President named Lincoln."

Caro's evaluation of LBJ depends on a historical premise, that because of the filibuster rules the Senate prior to Johnson had ceased to operate as the Founders intended. In fact, Caro writes a synoptic history of the Senate that precedes the main narrative about Johnson, arguing that the Senate had become "a mighty dam standing athwart, and stemming, the tides of social justice.... [The Senate] empowered, with an immense power, the forces of conservatism and reaction in America." Caro's "underbook" about the Senate concludes that the long-running Southern filibuster against civil rights was not a geographic anomaly but the essence of the Senate at work.

WITH THIS PREMISE, CARO REVEALS himself to be a relic of Progressivism. LBJ comes to sight in Caro's narrative as a supremely talented man bobbing like a cork on the tides of history. This is the basis for both LBJ's greatness and his shortcomings, as is evident in Caro's ambivalent comments such as "there were times when [LBJ's] interests coincided with America's interests." The repeated comparison to Lincoln is instructive. In Caro's hands LBJ was plainly not imbued with great purpose like Lincoln or even like Franklin or Theodore Roosevelt, nor does he have the even-tempered virtues of Eisenhower or Gerald Ford. Instead, LBJ's success derived from the happy confluence of the tides of history and personal ambition. Abraham Lincoln came to his views about slavery and equality because of a principled understanding of the Constitution and Declaration of Independence. Johnson, by contrast, said that "It's not the job of a politician to go around saying principled things." The Constitution, Johnson remarked, is a series of compromises, and this statement suggests that Johnson had little awareness of or regard for the principles behind those compromises.

Caro's historicist premise makes it impossible to draw meaningful distinctions between Lincoln and LBJ—and will make it impossible, further along in Caro's epic account, for him to distinguish between civil rights law informed by

the principles of natural right and civil rights distorted by the ideology of egalitarianism. While *Master of the Senate* clearly foreshadows LBJ's troubled presidency, it also fills readers with skepticism about how Caro will judge the defects of Johnson's Great Society.

Master of the Senate ends with a vignette that captures the problem with Johnson in a way that Caro probably doesn't fully appreciate. After the election of 1960, which elevated Johnson to the vice presidency, Johnson went to the Senate Democratic Caucus before resigning his seat and attempted to get the consent of his fellow Senators to continue presiding over the caucus and, in effect, still run the Senate. He was startled when his fellow Senators rebuffed this brazen invitation to violate the separation of powers. It is hard to decide whether LBJ's greater failing here was lack of respect for constitutional principle, or his complete misreading of his former colleagues. For someone renowned for his ability to read other men, this failure of perception is stunning.

Caro dwells on this episode only as a marker of how fast Johnson lost his political clout on the way to an unhappy vice presidency. But it anticipates the problem that should be at the center of Caro's forthcoming volumes on Johnson's presidency: how could such an astute politician persist for so many years in misjudging the nature of his most determined political enemy, North Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh? Johnson's White House aide John P. Roche wrote years after LBJ died that he could not make Johnson understand that Ho Chi Minh was a dedicated Leninist. Johnson, Roche recalls, kept asking, "What does Ho want?" as if Ho were a mayor of Chicago holding out for five new post offices." Such a question could only come from a man for whom politics is merely a nihilistic series of deals, utterly without any principled ground. Although the Vietnam mess is behind us, much of the Johnson legacy in domestic policy, especially the unprincipled civil rights legacy of affirmative action, is still with us. Caro's thorough narrative will be well worth waiting for, but *Master of the Senate* leaves us with the feeling that he will resolve neither his ambivalence nor our doubts about this giant figure.

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Book Review by Delba Winthrop

AN AMBIVALENT TOCQUEVILLE

Tocqueville Between Two Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life,
by Sheldon S. Wolin. Princeton University Press, 650 pages, \$35



YET ANOTHER BOOK ON TOCQUEVILLE! This one, however, is a unique achievement. Most books on Tocqueville are either biographies or studies of one, or at most a few, of his writings. Sheldon Wolin's *Tocqueville Between Two Worlds* is an attempt to arrive at a coherent, comprehensive understanding of Tocqueville's political theory by analyzing and evaluating his political life and writings as a whole. It raises all the important questions, takes texts seriously—Tocqueville's as well as those of other political theorists—and is full of original and provocative readings of these texts.

Making sense of the whole of Tocqueville's life and writings is no mean feat. As most of his admirers know, Tocqueville was "between two worlds" in several senses. Unusually political for a theorist and unusually theoretical for a politician, he spent his life in alternation between periods of sustained intellectual activity and a full-time, if less than brilliant, political career. As a young man, he journeyed to the New World to observe its "great democratic republic" with the intention of edifying the Old World. His *Democracy in America*, now adopted by Americans as if written by one of their own and for themselves, was in fact intended to clarify France's political choices. Despite his having been born and bred an aristocrat, he consciously embraced the new democracy if not quite wholeheartedly, at least (so to speak) wholeheartedly. He accepted democracy's legitimacy; and so he detailed its merits, even as he lamented the loss of some aspects of aristocracy and warned of the difficulties democracy was likely to pose for the future. Though he had found much to praise in rough-and-ready Jacksonian America,

when he finally won elective office in France's mid-19th-century bourgeois regime, he could find little in it that did not inspire contempt or foreboding. With the revolution of 1848, he opted for the contemptible bourgeoisie over the loathsome radicals, avowing his opposition at all costs to socialism and to the centralization, bureaucratization, and depoliticization he thought went with it even more surely than with bourgeois democracy. Retiring from political life with the ascendancy of Louis Napoleon, he wrote his posthumously published *Souvenirs* and began *The Old Regime and the Revolution*, books in which he seemed increasingly pessimistic about a liberal democratic political future. Notwithstanding frequent self-doubt and a low opinion of his contemporaries, he retained an enduring appreciation of greatness and an unquenchable thirst for it.

Wolin appears to have read every word Tocqueville wrote, and he treats thematically each of Tocqueville's three major works, incorporating minor writings, letters, and biographical detail to excellent advantage. His readings of each of these elements are unfailingly intelligent, even if not always persuasive and, on occasion, infuriating. He displays an impressive amount of learning about Tocqueville. Whether he has learned from him is another matter. In the end, it seems fair to say that Tocqueville is the medium through which Wolin, a much-honored political theorist and man of the Left, comes to refract his own thoughts on politics. For often, when disagreeing with Tocqueville, Wolin simply leaves unstated his (presumably superior) opinion and the case for it, as if these should be too obvious to the reader to mention.

Why, one inevitably asks, would Wolin have devoted so much time and effort to this study? Tocqueville, Wolin notes, was perhaps "the last influential theorist...to have truly cared about political life." Ultimately, however, to Wolin's manifest disappointment, Tocqueville took politics in one sense too seriously and, in another, not seriously enough. On the one hand, Tocqueville allowed his engagement in partisan politics to affect his theorizing, according to Wolin. On the other, despite the ardent admiration he had voiced in the first volume of *Democracy in America* for the participatory democracy of the New England township, Tocqueville grew increasingly willing to accept a less meaningful notion of citizenship in America as well as a much narrower suffrage in France. He was oblivious to the political aspirations and capacities of French workers in 1848, as he was to those of workers and peasants under the Old Regime. In the end, Wolin's Tocqueville cannot bridge the gap between the Old and New Worlds by finding a way to secure for all the political freedom and participation that a very few had experienced in aristocracy. Instead, he settled for "rearguard actions" and the attempt, likely to fail, to burden the postmodern world with an aching awareness of the democratic political life that might have been.

WOLIN'S EXPLICATION OF TOCQUEVILLE's works is, to repeat, solid and at times excellent—especially his treatment of the New England township and of the ideological character of modernity. It is his evaluation of Tocqueville that can be, shall we say, idiosyncratic. *Democracy in America* in particular,

Wolin argues, is a book that still appeals to many readers today because it accommodates a range of objections to democracy and the worries of "liberals, conservatives, and social scientists" about its "alleged dangers." Not willing to belong to any of these categories himself and presumably not wishing to see the unwitting seduced by Tocqueville, Wolin looks at attempts to moderate democracy with a more critical eye.

This is a valuable perspective, even if it leads, on occasion, to misreadings. Wherever Tocqueville distinguishes some few from the majority of human beings, Wolin finds the class bias of an aristocrat against "the many" or "the demos"—Wolin's terms, not Tocqueville's. He does so even where there is no textual basis for the assumption and sometimes good reason to infer otherwise. For example, in a fragment from the unfinished second volume of *The Old Regime*, Tocqueville ascribes to a few men an "instinctive, irresistible and almost involuntary" penchant for liberty; yet he also suggests that this taste may be characteristic of a free people. How, in any case, could Wolin, in quoting and commenting on the remark, take this to be a quality that one acquires by inheritance or breeding? Similarly, in a discussion of Tocqueville's assertion in *Democracy in America* that rights are the appearance of virtue in the political world, Wolin finds an aristocratic "paternalism and moralism," attributing to Tocqueville the view that virtue "is demonstrated by obeying superiors." But Tocqueville speaks of a recognition of a "right to command" in "those like oneself," and thus, more plausibly, of obedience to whoever currently wields legitimate authority. (Leaving aside the issue of class bias, there is an important dispute here between Tocqueville and Wolin on the ground and meaning of rights. One longs for a head-on confrontation over this substantive matter rather than a snide dismissal of Tocqueville's position.)

In sum, minor departures of this sort from Tocqueville's texts make it easier for Wolin to conclude that, for Tocqueville, freedom is conceivable only in a society "where inequalities of rank and privilege [are] paramount." A more

constructive reading of *The Old Regime*, as Wolin himself astutely observes, might lead one to ask whether it is now still possible to devise institutions and a civic culture in which different social classes are encouraged to cooperate politically.

ANOTHER SOURCE OF CONSISTENT misreading or misrepresentation is Wolin's skeptical assessment of Tocqueville's attitude toward democratic mores and religion. These, for Wolin, are imposed on the *demos* by the political or intellectual elites that devise them in order to "repress" it. One might briefly state several objections to this assessment. First, it reflects a vast overestimation of the place Tocqueville expects or desires any self-appointed intellectual elite to hold in a democracy. Second, Tocqueville may speak of the American people as hypocritical in their profession of religion, but he never calls them dupes. Their belief, be it in the breach or the observance, is their own, and in matters of faith, it is this that counts. (I note in passing that Wolin incorrectly attributes some rather cynical remarks about religion and philosophy to Tocqueville rather than to their actual author, his correspondent, Kergorlay.) Third, is it the case that adherence to religious beliefs and habits of morality—including women's marital fidelity—amounts to repression? Wolin never appreciates that for Tocqueville, religion is not so much a means of social control as a source of strength—of empowerment, as we now say—for individuals as well as peoples. Finally, could the New England township as described by Tocqueville and admired by Wolin, have worked without such mores? For Wolin, it seems, there is democratic freedom only when the *demos* believes itself free to refashion itself at any instant. Just what is the comprehensive vision of human and democratic political life that informs Wolin's rejection of Tocqueville here, and what are the arguments in support of it?

There is another pervasive misreading worth noting. For Wolin's Tocqueville, genuine politics must be "disinterested." Did Tocqueville ever really think this possible or even desirable? Wolin refers to texts proving that Tocqueville

is well aware that an appearance of disinterested passion is an attractive quality in a politician. Yet in describing "great parties," in which individual or particular interest may be well hidden, Tocqueville observes that it nonetheless "always plays the greatest role in political passions." Similarly, his aristocrat may be able to deceive others and especially himself about the extent to which self-interest affects his actions and choices, but deception this is. Even Tocqueville's New England township, the model of democratic citizenship for Wolin, works precisely because it manages to interest townspeople not only in their common concerns, but in their shared power. For Tocqueville, the problem is not to persuade individuals to set self-interest aside. Rather, one must demonstrate to them that they have an interest in politics and especially in political activity, and that this activity can be an outlet for considerable ambition and a source of personal pride.

Later in life, Tocqueville may indeed have become pessimistic about the efficacy of a love of political freedom grounded in interest. But at least for a time, he held out the possibility that, with the support of institutions of political freedom, calculating self-interested ambition might turn into an instinct and repeated action would give rise to a habit and taste for public service. One might say that, for Tocqueville, insofar as anything can be done to preserve political life in the modern world, what must be done is not to purify souls, but to enlarge them by giving men a more capacious understanding of interest.

As should be clear, Sheldon Wolin and I disagree at times in our interpretations of Tocqueville. Our political disagreements, I suspect, are greater still. What prompts me to recommend *Tocqueville Between Two Worlds* is the passionate, if not quite disinterested, concern for the survival of politics in our postmodern world that inspires and inspirits it.

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Book Review by Michael Zuckert

JOHN RAWLS, HISTORIAN

Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, by John Rawls, edited by Barbara Herman.
Harvard University Press, 416 pages, \$49.95



JOHN RAWLS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY THE best-known American practitioner of the ancient discipline of political philosophy—although just the other day I did meet someone in a university who had never heard of him. Most of us who do know of him do not particularly associate him with the history of philosophy. He plies his trade more in the mode of contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy, which tends to draw a rather sharp distinction between “doing philosophy” and studying the history of philosophy. One of these analytic gentlemen, for example, said recently to a distinguished acquaintance of mine who has spent many years studying Kant and German idealism, that he always wondered “what it was like to be a scholar,” with the understanding, of course, that “mere” was implicitly modifying “scholar” in that query. In his own most famous works, *A Theory of Justice* and *Political Liberalism*, Rawls never says anything quite so patronizing, and indeed he mentions figures from the history of philosophy from time to time. Nonetheless, from these mentions and the general style of his thinking one would not conclude that he takes the history of philosophy particularly seriously. Indeed, from some of the comments he makes about thinkers like Aristotle or Nietzsche in *A Theory of Justice* one might be led to wonder whether he had ever read these authors.

That conclusion must now be substantially revised with the appearance of *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*. This volume is one of several new works by Rawls that have appeared in recent years when his actual writing activity has been sharply curtailed if not ended by ill-health. As the title suggests, the volume at hand is the text of a course in moral philosophy of-

fered at Harvard in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. The actual coverage is a good deal narrower than the title implies, for Rawls limits himself to modern philosophy entirely, and is very selective within that field. Ten of the 20 lectures are on Kant, five on Hume, two on Leibnitz (present as a point of contrast and background for Kant), and two on Hegel (present as a critic and supplement to Kant). There is, in addition, an introductory lecture on Modern Moral Philosophy providing a background in the entire history of moral philosophy prior to the moment when Rawls picks up the story.

Clearly, the central figure is Kant, not surprising, given the frequent identification of Rawls as some sort of Kantian. Interestingly, the editor, Barbara Herman, a former student of Rawls and herself a distinguished writer on moral philosophy, tells us that the course whose lectures we have here supplanted a more general (and more standard) course in ethics where Rawls treated the “usual suspects” in moral philosophy—Aristotle, Kant, Mill, and rotating others—as exemplars of the chief alternative types of ethical systems, perfectionist, deontological, and utilitarian. The older course of lectures predated *A Theory of Justice*; the newer course evolved out of work Rawls undertook on Kant beginning around 1974, i.e., after *A Theory of Justice*.

I dwell so much on the history of Rawls's *Lectures* because a volume like this always raises the question of where its real interest lies—in the insights we glean from the philosophers, or in the insights into the thought of the historian-philosopher himself? This question obtrudes itself strongly when we look at the historical writings of philosophic figures like Hegel, Heidegger, or Leo Strauss, and it does so in Rawls's

case as well. Certainly in the cases of Hegel and Heidegger we are often driven to conclude that what they see in the thought of their predecessors has much more to do with their own philosophic activity than with the (mere?) scholarly attempt to understand accurately the philosophers they study. Both Hegel and Heidegger are famous for eschewing the goal of attempting to understand the thinkers of the past as they understood themselves. Both, of course, have elaborate philosophic justifications for rejecting that particular aspiration.

Rawls is not like them. Perhaps surprisingly, he is much closer to Strauss in his approach to the thinkers of the past. He does not accept the perspective of many of his fellow 20th-century philosophers, who believe that contemporary philosophy has superseded historical philosophy as, say, contemporary mathematics or physics supersedes historical mathematics or physics. He does not agree that philosophy is or has been “progressive” in the way that (arguably) mathematics and physics are. Thus he claims “philosophic,” not mere historical or scholarly interest in the history of philosophy. “Philosophic interest,” as he understands it, pushes him in two somewhat different, partially conflicting directions. On the one side, he seeks to be historically accurate. This requires patient listening to the philosophers, involving, above all, an attempt to understand them in their own terms. That means trying to see what problems they were trying to solve, what they thought the tasks and means of moral thinking were, and not holding them up to some model of the problems or methods of philosophy regnant today. Thus, to understand Kant, for instance, means to set his moral thinking into the context of the rest of his

philosophic project and of the chief alternatives that Kant saw to his positions. After reading Rawls's *Lectures*, nobody would rank him among those scholars of the history of philosophy, who single-mindedly attempt to reproduce the context of a given thinker's philosophic activity down to the most minute minutiae (I will name no names), but the reader will respect Rawls's sober effort to take the philosophers on their own terms and to reproduce their philosophic enterprises as they saw them.

On the other side, Rawls avoids reducing philosophers to their historical context because he approaches past texts with a philosophic aim. By that he means that "the study of these figures" is supposed to "help us now . . . with our problems." In other words, "These texts have much to teach us." Rawls is not afraid to learn from, as well as to learn about the philosophers of the past. "Knowing these works puts before us possibilities of thought vastly different from these we would normally be aware of." Rawls attempts to appropriate the thinkers of the past into his own thinking, and thus to the question I posed earlier—does this book tell us about the philosophers discussed or about Rawls—the answer is, both. In some ways what we have here is an instance of what the late Hans Georg Gadamer described as a "fusion of horizons," with both the attendant strengths and difficulties of that enterprise.

So, what do we learn from Rawls about Hume, or Kant, or Hegel? We learn first that Rawls has studied their works very carefully; that he has tried to set their thinking about morality into the broader context of their thought. For example, he gives a brief but provocative account of the "fideism of nature" in Hume's theory of knowledge, into which he argues Hume's moral philosophy properly fits. Another example: he gives us an extremely helpful account of the "categorical imperative procedure" in Kant, an account that responds to the frequent criticism that the categorical imperative is merely an empty formation, unable to generate any content for its moral demands, or at least unable to do so without illicitly appealing to empirical and consequentialist considerations that seem ruled out. He gives, as well, a highly plausible account of how the three formulations of the categorical imperative cohere. He shows himself to be a reasonably good reader of Hegel, a thinker I would have thought very foreign to his cast of mind.

IT MUST BE SAID THAT IN HIS INTERPRETATION of the philosophers Rawls is not always original; he adopts from time to time others' interpretations of the thinkers as the basis or as part of his own interpretation. It must also be said that Rawls does not claim any sort of finality for the interpretations he puts forward. In-

deed, his presentation is marked by a refreshing modesty and respect for his subjects: "I always took for granted that the writers we were studying were much smarter than I was. If they were not, why was I wasting my time and the students' time by studying them? ...All the great figures... lie to some degree beyond us, no matter how hard we try to master their thought."

Valuable as *Lectures* is for insight and reflection on the philosophers discussed, to my mind the book is yet more revealing about Rawls himself. Over the years, Rawls has given us three or perhaps four different versions of his political philosophy. He has not always been clear on how he understands the relation between the different versions, and a good deal of debate exists over how he means to ground the system. *Lectures* helps, for it comes in the period between *Theory of Justice* (1971) and *Political Liberalism* (1993), yet it does not particularly support the position taken in either. As Barbara Herman points out, the period in which Rawls delivered these lectures was the period in which he developed his famous statement on "Kantian Constructivism." Readers familiar with that will notice many similarities with the Kant portions of the *Lectures*. We see in *Lectures* the evidence of Rawls attempting to work over Kant so as to bring him into closer propinquity to Rawls's own theory.

In *Theory of Justice*, Rawls eschewed lengthy reflections on the methodology of moral theory; he referred the reader to an early essay, which was, in turn, a stripped-down version of his doctoral dissertation. The account of moral theory underlying *Theory of Justice* was Humean, however, in the sense that, like David Hume, it attempted to expound morality in a way that would be equivalent to the scientific accounts of natural phenomena, like the motions of the planets in the solar system. This method was meant by both Hume and Rawls to be a way of circumventing the difficulties posed by the distinction between Is and Ought—between what is and what should be—that Hume had analyzed so fiercely in his early *Treatise on Human Nature*. Unlike many of his followers, Hume did not conclude that the Is-Ought distinction implied that no moral judgments could be valid, but it did turn him toward a style of moral theory meant to steer clear of this so-called gap. For Hume the real issue was not whether there could be valid moral judgments—he recognized that there were such—but rather how they could be. How did the ought premises in our moral judgments arise? Where did they come from? He found their source not in reason but in the feeling or moral sentiments, in turn traceable from the moral judgments normally made.

Rawls's substantive analysis was quite different from Hume's, however, and veered in

Kantian directions, although he did not reproduce Kant's position on justice, either. The most significantly Kantian element was his claim that one of the primary data for moral theory was the judgment that individuals are not to be sacrificed to the good of each other, or even to the good of the whole: no one is to be treated merely as a means. Rawls rightly understood this principle to point away from all forms of utilitarianism, including Hume's proto-utilitarianism. This insight led Rawls to revive what had seemed a discredited approach in political philosophy—contractarianism. His doctrine of the "original position," the hypothetical, pre-political condition from which the principles of justice were to be deduced, reflected the imperative that society honor the claim that no one be treated merely as a means. Rawls guaranteed this by demanding that the principles of justice be those that could achieve unanimous agreement by self-interested but risk-averse persons in the original position, a requirement that would unfailingly generate a kind of redistributionist welfare state in which no one could be treated merely as a means.

ON THE BASIS OF HIS SUSTAINED encounter with Kant in the *Lectures*, Rawls reformulates many, perhaps most of the important elements of *Theory*, excising its rational-choice side and replacing it with the Kantian-style notion of "the moral powers" of rationality and reasonableness. But this deeply Kantian moment proved to be a transitional one, as Rawls moved on to the "political conception" contained in *Political Liberalism*.

The interaction between Rawls the interpreter of past philosophy and Rawls the theorist of justice is what makes *Lectures* so interesting a book. In his confrontation with Kant we can see something of the impetus behind his own thinking, but we can also see how his own philosophical interests shape his reading of Kant in certain directions. Rawls produces a very non-metaphysical Kant, not entirely persuasive in light of Kant's title for his chief ethical work, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Although Rawls's "fusion of horizons" may set up insuperable barriers to his achieving the more strictly historical side of his project in those lectures, he gives us here a good, if challenging, reading of several of the great moral philosophers of the 18th and 19th centuries. If you are interested in Kant or Rawls, it is definitely worthwhile even if you find yourself (as I do) dissenting from Rawls's own political philosophy.

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Book Review by Mark Blitz

THE POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INTELLECTUALS

The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics, by Mark Lilla.
New York Review of Books Press, 230 pages, \$24.95

Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse,
by Richard Wolin. Princeton University Press, 312 pages, \$29.95



WHAT IS THE POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY of serious intellectuals? What should those who consider matters not as specialists but broadly or even philosophically attempt to achieve politically through their teachings and actions?

The two books before us, Mark Lilla's *The Reckless Mind* and Richard Wolin's *Heidegger's Children*, are concerned with these problems as they appear to several thinkers affected by Martin Heidegger. Lilla considers Carl Schmitt, Alexandre Kojève, Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and to a lesser extent Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, and Heidegger himself. Lilla's theme and summary chapter concern intellectuals' proclivity to tyranny. Wolin looks at Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, Herbert Marcuse and, at some length, Heidegger: his theme is the reaction of Heidegger's Jewish students to his Nazism, and the continued influence on their own political thinking of the illiberal milieu that he reflected.

Although all these thinkers are gifted, few deserve truly extended study. I say this despite the fact that each is more penetrating than nearly anyone writing today. We are declining from our decline. In a sense both Lilla and Wolin recognize this, precisely because they state the themes I have mentioned rather than claiming to be guided fully by the thinkers' own purposes.

As it turns out, the themes themselves are pursued fitfully. Each is at best a minimally developed program. Neither is a firmly guiding compositional motif. This surely is connected to the books' origins, Lilla's as separate articles in the *New York Review of Books* and *Times Liter-*

ary Supplement and several of Wolin's in *The New Republic*. Other themes—Lilla's analysis of the theological interest of several of his subjects and Wolin's of the common intellectual and historical roots of their illiberal political attitudes—are equally interesting and no less (or more) developed. No question, however, is truly pressed: even Lilla's concluding discussion of tyranny and philosophy makes no reference to the thinkers he discussed earlier.

Although Wolin does not work through his theme, the issues I mentioned do structure his approach. The result is that his discussions of Arendt, Löwith, Jonas, and Marcuse are not complete, nor are they meant to be complete. One cannot read his book to receive a full description of their thought. He writes as an intellectual historian, moreover, so he sometimes verges on reducing his subjects to their origins. That said, his pursuit, however episodic, of the question of Heidegger's continuing effect on his Jewish students leads him to pay attention to Löwith and Jonas who in this country are too often ignored, and to deal critically and convincingly with Arendt's work on totalitarianism and the Eichmann trial. These are significant contributions.

Lilla's theme is less a matter of intellectual history and more an attempt to look at intellectuals through the perspective of a single problem. Although he does not truly pursue the issue of tyranny his approach leads him to consider his authors more completely than Wolin, and often with an eye toward larger concerns. He raises questions, however briefly, about the truth of their positions and not only their origins. His

discussions, nonetheless, sometimes betray their own genesis, because their quality is to a degree dependent on the quality of the books that occasioned them. This difficulty is especially prominent when he covers Arendt, Heidegger, and Jaspers in a single chapter, prompted by letters among the three of them. His analysis here stays largely on the surface analytically and in the case of Heidegger is misleading. That said, Lilla's approach to the affair between Arendt and Heidegger is much more balanced, mature, and free of ideological nonsense than that of most other critics. His other chapters, moreover, are deeper and more acute. All are intelligent, fair-minded, and properly critical, some (for example on Benjamin and Foucault) are nice examples of how to understand sympathetically a thinker with whom one disagrees, and two (the chapters on Schmitt and Foucault) are in my judgment the best comprehensive short discussions that currently exist.

I

THE FIRST AND IN A SENSE THE FINAL responsibility of intellectuals, *qua* intellectuals, is to secure and improve as best they can in their own circumstances the conditions that make their enterprise possible. Self-interest fully and properly grasped will lead them to a fundamental moderation, from which, occasionally, an appropriate radical action might follow. Ultimately, this requires that intellectuals need to consider two things, their own enterprise at its peak or in its best light; and the effects on each other of intellectual effort, on

the one hand, and a reasonably free and virtuous political life, on the other. The difficulty with all or almost all the thinkers that Wolin and Lilla discuss is their failure properly to consider these two issues.

The first consideration requires that the full meaning, significance, and, consequently, the full radicalism of philosophical inquiry come clearly enough into view that one can judge honestly the justification and intention of one's own lesser efforts. If this does not occur, the characteristic distortions of philosophic inquiry, the characteristic sophistries that Plato explores in his *Sophist* and *Republic*, will take root. The difference between intellectualism however impressive and philosophy, which seeks nothing except the truth about what is, will be passed over or denied. Sophistries will not be seen for what they are or will be mistaken for the real thing. The radicalism of unbridled inquiry will congeal into the half-true assertion that categories, distinctions, indeed all important articulations are conventional. The search for what truly is highest will exhaust itself and rest content with bogus theology. The obviously unconventional place of the philosopher, moreover, will transform itself into the fashionable effort to shock. The strange dignity or prominence of the philosopher will become willful peculiarity or isolation. Even the philosophic attempt to find out what is simply natural is prone to distortion when the natural is seen only as unconventional spontaneity, or only as the material or environmental. In one way or the other each of the intellectuals discussed in these books exemplifies these distortions.

The second consideration requires not just that the highest aspiration of the intellectual life be understood but that the elements of good politics be grasped. The connection between the two must then be fully thought through. When this does not happen, the characteristic distortions of political understanding and of the intellectuals' view of their political place occur that Plato explores in his *Statesman* and *Republic*. Thinkers come to believe that their radical schemes for perfection actually can take place in the flesh because they do not face the inevitable limits of political life, a life based not only on the wish to be just but also on opinion, fraud, and force. Or, having discovered politics to be imperfect, they come to believe it to be nothing but force and deceit. At the same time, they tend at least today to assume that the prestige of science and of intellectual life mean that these will go on safely forever. For these reasons, the differences between what intellectuals think and what they should do politically, and the dangers of their extremism to themselves and others often are ignored, just as the difference between how they use their minds and the true goal that justifies

the radical intellect is set aside. Ultimately it is only a proper understanding of the true meaning of free thought and its conditions that can enable thinkers to avoid these distortions and to remain both radical in their own domain and appropriately moderate politically.

II

THIS SKETCH OF THE POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL problem obviously owes much to Leo Strauss's understanding of Plato. His view in turn owes more than a little to the territory opened by Heidegger, although most of Heidegger's students and their own students failed to explore it adequately. We will further improve our grasp of the issues that motivated most of the authors about whom Lilla and Wolin write if we recreate for a moment the perspective of a student studying with Heidegger, when he himself was young.

From such a standpoint, several things would have looked remarkable. By the time they came to his courses in their very early twenties or even as with Hannah Arendt in her teens, Heidegger's students would have read old books seriously and completely, often in the original. What precisely these books had to teach, however, why exactly they were being read beyond the general desire for culture or education, would not have been clear. In Kant's case it was evident enough that the neo-Kantians—figures such as Cohen, Natorp, Windleband and Cassirer—believed that he had something to say. In other cases this was less obvious. Who, after all, taught Plato and Aristotle, the twin pillars of thinking, as if they pointed to, grappled with, or answered the most vital questions? Heidegger's most visible initial impact was to make ancient thinkers come alive, to treat them with concentrated passion. It is not that what he said was clear—Löwith and Jonas report that the mystery was part of the attraction—but that he (who so visibly excelled his contemporaries) treated them as indispensable. The so-called history of philosophy was a vital part of philosophy itself. Although Heidegger is now often treated as if he plays with texts willfully, he in fact normally does not. His care should be visible to anyone—at least up through the courses he offered on Nietzsche that lasted well into the 1940s and were published in 1961. His lectures on Plato's *Sophist*, with their painstaking analysis both of the *Sophist* and of the sixth book of Aristotle's *Ethics*, are the most obvious example of this care, and they are lectures Löwith would have attended and of which Arendt, Jonas, Marcuse, and Kojève would have been aware.

This is not to say that Heidegger usually comments on these books completely from be-

ginning to end or that finding another author's intention is his final goal. But his teaching always revolved around careful discussions with others. The result was that for his generation Heidegger saved great minds from ossification. Reading texts carefully, taking the ancients seriously, seeing what actually was at stake in Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche became in one way or the other a hallmark of Heidegger's students. The arbitrariness of Derrida one generation removed can be laid only indirectly at Heidegger's door. His more immediate students, both those Wolin and Lilla discuss and Hans Gadamer, Jacob Klein, and still others in Heidegger's orbit, learned to take old books with deep concern. One wonders if Strauss's exquisite care in reading texts would have occurred when and as it did apart from Heidegger's teaching.

Today, of course, we face this same question of the purpose of old books, but our circumstances are in some ways more dire. While it was easy then for old books to be read simply as old, as part of a normal tradition of education, few today have read these books to begin with. "Great" books labor under the contempt of Derrida and Heidegger's other step-grandchildren. Strauss and other counter examples are not sufficiently influential. Whereas Heidegger helped make clear why such books were being read by those already conditioned to read them, it is difficult today to find people who have read very many of these books at all or believe they should. Who can wish to read well who does not first wish to read? This is one of the ways in which the condition of "culture" generally, i.e. the condition not just of the intellect but of politics in the widest sense, must concern those who aspire to philosophy.

III

A STUDENT IS INTERESTED NOT ONLY IN books but in their ideas, or more precisely he is finally interested in books because he is interested in ideas. Are the ideas vital, central, and urgent or are they the merely inherited topics and conundrums that define an academic field? Is philosophy an activity of immense urgency or merely a set of games at which one is better or worse and from which one can earn a living and live respectably or even outrageously, but in any event securely? Heidegger did not merely bring the old books alive. He reenergized the meaning of philosophical concepts and the whole point of philosophy. Marcuse wrote to Heidegger that he had taught him what philosophy is.

Heidegger freed the traditional topics by seeking to locate them in their ground. He placed words back in the soil from which they

grew and were drawn. Philosophy had become academic or scholastic, an ordinary or acknowledged pursuit even if one with special power. Its possibility was taken for granted because its existence was actual in academic life. Heidegger, however, raised the following question: What is the ordinary or basic perspective from which philosophy arises, and how does it originate from this perspective? Philosophy's radical questioning is most unusual because it questions the ordinary. Yet its very activity must somehow originate in the ordinary. The "everyday" itself, however, is mysterious in the sense that it manifests itself less as a single ordinary perspective or horizon than as a variety of peoples, cultures, histories, and political regimes. One important step that Heidegger took to revitalize philosophy was to attempt to root it again in ordinary existence.

Needless to say, how Heidegger did this is controversial. His understanding of human *being* as fundamentally open to a Being that is beyond theoretical and practical activity but makes them intelligible, and his articulating the various existential structures that describe this openness, are central to his endeavor. Wolin suggests that Heidegger means to make theoretical activity no longer the central element of human being. This is correct, but Heidegger also intends to find a ground beyond ordinary practice; attention to the ordinary world of tools and work is only a clue to this ground. Wolin also suggests that Heidegger links living one's own historical existence to our basic existential openness to Being. This too is correct, except that Wolin overly connects historical activity as Heidegger understands it to the immediate facts of Heidegger's or anyone else's life. What is central for Heidegger is what makes history possible, not this or that set of facts. This is why Heidegger scorns biography and social milieu in discussing philosophers, a disdain that Wolin finds hard to understand.

Wolin's confusion about how Heidegger justifies this disdain arises from his understandable difficulty in grasping Heidegger's discussions of history. This confusion emerges again in what I believe is Wolin's overemphasis on the immediate historical facts as the cause of Heidegger's support for the Nazis. After all, there was much in the air and on the ground other than the Nazis and their views. Heidegger chose as he did because of the illiberalism and totalizing perspective inherent in his understanding of the decisive importance of the "people" and of "authentic" existential choice. What the unimpeded intellect and political excellence share, but also how they must differ, could not come properly

to light. From this Heideggerian perspective the facts appeared in a certain way: different facts would have appeared differently and did for Heidegger in later times. The issues of the 1920s and 1930s looked to him as they did because of his intellectual standpoint and endeavor that brought them to life. Wolin deserves praise for the serious way he faces the connection between Heidegger's politics and his thought, but I believe that despite his searching discussion of the "people" (the *Volk*) and the origins of *Being and Time*, he makes this connection too historical and not, fundamentally, intellectual.

IV

HEIDEGGER'S SEEKING TO ROOT thought in what is ordinary opened a new view for many of his students. Political philosophy, especially ancient political philosophy, begins with just this question of the link between the theoretical and the everyday. The root of the reasoned life in lives devoted to goods other than understanding, and the place and limits of reason in these lives, come vividly into view. In this way philosophy is justified as it could not be by Heidegger himself, yet in terms he began to clarify. At the least, the question of justification could be raised intelligibly. The discoveries of theory also could be accounted for in a manner similar to Heidegger's notion that theory does not deal with alien worlds but, rather, makes thematic what comes to light in ordinary action and in the meaning of the things we use. Although Heidegger's work is not necessary for and, as developed, is in important and obvious respects counter to political philosophy, the questions he addresses helped set the stage for Strauss and Klein.

Lilla's final chapter, a thoughtful discussion of the lure of tyranny for intellectuals, is a good example of the approach this standpoint opens up. After discussing the possibility of ascribing the tyrannical lure to a surfeit of French intellectual engagement or a surfeit of German intellectual apoliticism, to an excess of reason without judgment or of irrationalism, he looks for a more adequate standpoint. He finds it in Plato's analysis of the link between tyranny, *eros*, and philosophy in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. Common roots of tyranny and philosophy enrich our grasp of their profound difference. I believe Lilla's own discussion would have been improved had he considered the power and possible madness of spiritedness, anger, and pride as well as of *eros*, and had he considered more the question of justice and our misunderstandings of it. Nonetheless, it is

a fine discussion on its own.

V

THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THINKING SERIOUSLY about the connection between theory and practice were pursued less successfully by others in Heidegger's circle. For several of the authors discussed in these books—Marcuse, Schmitt, Kojève, and Arendt—politics was a central activity or theme. Wolin believes Arendt to be the foremost political thinker of the 20th century. Yet his cogent attack on her *Origins of Totalitarianism* and, especially, on her irresponsible *Eichmann in Jerusalem* belies this general judgment. Lilla describes at length Carl Schmitt's work, his Nazism, and the current fascination with his claim that the essence of politics is the split between friends and enemies. Still, Lilla concludes, correctly, that Schmitt's significance is vastly overstated. Wolin ascribes Marcuse's politics to the Marxism that preexisted whatever existentialism or Freudianism he later added to it, and (to a lesser degree) to the general illiberalism Wolin finds in the thought of Löwith and Jonas as well. Lilla ascribes Kojève's attraction to the world state or world bureaucracy to his Hegelianism, and to the lure of the tyrannical generally. We may say that in each case these thinkers misconstrued the link between thought and action.

Wolin and Lilla's discussions of the political thought of these authors have much to offer. In particular, they display the great virtue of not making excuses for political excess. In the end, however, I believe their analysis is imperfect because, strange as it may seem, they hold their authors to too low a standard. They usually rest content with reporting—and where necessary, criticizing—standpoints and positions but do not consider rigorously enough the arguments and evidence that their authors employ. The ground and reasons for their pretensions or even their integrity can therefore not fully come to life. I have suggested that the chief responsibility of intellectuals is to protect the conditions of their own activity and that this requires them always to have in mind their enterprise at its peak. This means that our understanding of the political actions of intellectuals, for good or ill, will inevitably fall short to the degree we separate it from the question of what is true, and how what is true can best be pursued.

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Book Review by Thomas G. West

SINS OF THE FATHERS

Dostoevsky: The Mantle of the Prophet, 1871-1881, by Joseph Frank.
Princeton University Press, 800 pages, \$35



READERS OF ALL POLITICAL STRIPES, BUT especially conservatives, admire Fyodor Dostoevsky. The great anti-liberal Friedrich Nietzsche called him a master psychologist. Few writers do a better job of crawling into the soul of modern man; of man as such. Dostoevsky also deserves our respect for his passionate opposition to the extreme tendencies of modern thought — the murderous socialism and nihilistic despair—that were sweeping through Russia in his time and bore such evil fruit in the past century. But can he help us find a way out of the modern trends that he deplures?

The fifth and final volume of Joseph Frank's fine literary biography of Dostoevsky shows the novelist preoccupied with political and social themes in the last decade of his life. *The Mantle of the Prophet* usefully summarizes thousands of pages of Dostoevsky's political journalism, which few of today's readers know anything about. But the best part of the book is Frank's 140-page analysis of *The Brothers Karamazov* (1879), the masterpiece in which the novelist most profoundly engages modern nihilism.

Dostoevsky's *Brothers* tells the story of the rebellion of four sons against their father. Dostoevsky makes clear that each of the sons hated the father and at one time or another wished him dead, because he is evil. He cruelly torments other people. He makes money, greedy capitalist that he is, by taking advantage of people. He is a gross sensualist, seeking pleasure even in the gutter. He fathers a child on "stinking Lizaveta," the town madwoman. Why should one respect the authority of such an unjust father? Would it not be better if he were dead? The sons answer, each in his own way, yes. Frank notes that Dmitry's

defense lawyer, at the trial, almost openly defends patricide. Dostoevsky's novel is meant to prove, however, that father-killing is wrong unconditionally.

Although Smerdyakov is the killer, it is his brother Ivan who teaches him why the murder is justified. Ivan says that if there is no immortality, then "everything is permitted" (Magarshack's translation, Penguin Books, 1958). Not that Ivan is an indifferent relativist; he is deeply, passionately concerned about justice. Indeed, the conflict between his most powerful longings and the conclusions of his intellect drives him mad. Ivan is peculiarly open to patricide because he has already condemned God for being unjust. He has, as it were, sentenced God to death for his crimes against humanity. So the novel is about at least two killings: the murder of father Karamazov, and the murder of God.

Dostoevsky is a political thinker. It is one of the many merits of Frank's biography that he sees clearly that politics is a leading theme—in a sense, the dominant theme—of Dostoevsky's writings. Dostoevsky's deepest concern is the question of authority, who rules, and who should rule. Tentatively, we may say that his answer is that these four fathers should rule unconditionally and absolutely: God the Father; second, the fathers of God's church, such as Father Zossima; third, the Tsar, the father of his people; and fourth, the biological father, Karamazov.

As these answers make clear, Dostoevsky is a traditionalist *par excellence*. In fact, having reflected deeply on his own convictions, he makes the best case for traditionalist patriarchal conservatism that I know of. He is fully aware of certain disturbing, even repulsive, implications of

his position. He knows the sacrifices that must be made in order to embrace it. He is glad to offer up those sacrifices because he sees no alternative. In the end, however, Dostoevsky's example shows us why pure traditionalism is both intellectually untenable and politically dangerous. Wishing with all his heart to oppose the growing relativism and nihilism of his time (still growing today), he instead embraces and radicalizes it.

The Case Against God

READERS AND CRITICS ALIKE ARE DRAWN to the famous story of the Grand Inquisitor, which may well be the key to *The Brothers Karamazov*. In Ivan's story (and in the conversation preceding it) we are shown the ground of the novel's whole plot. Ivan in effect argues that both fathers, Karamazov and God, deserve to die, because although both create life, both also create great suffering. Ivan tells his brother Alyosha, "I do not accept God's world," because it is a world in which innocents must suffer. He then relates the story of a general who uses hounds to hunt down and tear to pieces an innocent boy, a serf. Ivan asks Alyosha what should be done to the man. "Shoot him!" Alyosha said softly, raising his eyes to his brother with a pale, twisted sort of smile.

Ivan and Alyosha agree: a being who knowingly permits the suffering of innocent children deserves to be killed. Yet God is just such a being. Fully aware of this implication, Alyosha whimpers, "This is rebellion." Ivan gets him to agree that he would never consent to the creation of a world in which even one innocent must suffer.

In his story of the Grand Inquisitor, Ivan pro-

ceeds to show that God the Father is not so different from the general who allows his hounds to tear the peasant boy to pieces. For Christ himself appears on earth in the midst of the Inquisition, and he has nothing to offer but "a gentle smile of infinite compassion." The Cardinal arrests Christ, who does not resist. He kisses the Inquisitor. In other words, he forgives him. But Christ does not even ask for repentance, let alone get it, from the evil old prelate. God the father sends his Son into the world as a powerless innocent. God and Christ do nothing to stop the suffering in the Inquisition, or in men's lives in general. Christ does not even attempt to stop the Church from opposing him. God does not solve the problem of human life, human suffering and the longing for release from suffering. That is why the Inquisitor, speaking for the Church, believes he must correct God's creation. Christ simply offers unconditional love to saints and sinners alike (including the Cardinal) and disappears.

The Inquisitor "glories in the fact that he and his followers [in the Roman Catholic Church] have at last vanquished freedom and have done so in order to make men happy." The Church will take away the freedom that Christ offered to men, because men cannot endure it and do not want it. Instead, the Church will supply men with "miracle, mystery, and authority" along with "bread." By "bread" the Cardinal means the material prosperity created by modern science, strikingly represented by Dostoevsky's recurring image of the modern Tower of Babel, which aims to create heaven on earth. The key to the Cardinal's plan is this combination of modern science, born of the atheistic desire to get rid of God, with the authority of the old Roman Catholic Church, which will rule men for their good, dictating every detail of their lives and making them happy.

For the Cardinal, and Ivan, the fundamental error of God the Father—an error repeated by Christ's message of freedom—was to create men free, free to sin, free to despair, free to turn against God. The Cardinal proposes to correct that error by denying men freedom and giving them what they desire. The Church, in this view, means to correct God's botched creation by enslaving men and conquering nature.

Frank sees clearly that the novel equates the murder of Fyodor Karamazov and Ivan's revolt against God. Frank believes that this equation is a weakness in Dostoevsky's plot, and that it is not quite plausible, given the fundamental goodness of God's creation. But Frank fails to notice that the key to Dostoevsky's case for authority is that it is made in the teeth of what his own characters, and perhaps Dostoevsky himself, see as a serious question about God's justice. Anticipating Frank's analysis, and stating it more forcefully,

Czeslaw Milosz observed (in his excellent essay "Dostoevsky and Western Intellectuals") that *The Brothers* is, at its heart, a meditation on the Russian intelligentsia's act of abolishing simultaneously the authority of God, the Tsar, and the *paterfamilias*.

Smerdyakov, the actual murderer, the illegitimate brother whose passions and countenance are altogether ugly, simply presents the true face of the intellectual Ivan, who is outwardly cultured, suave, and good-looking. Ivan is horrified as he discerns his own character with growing clarity. By the end of the novel, he goes insane. The crude and smirking Smerdyakov, consumed by hate, is the genuine expression of the liberal intelligentsia's revolt against the authority of the biological father, the father Tsar, the fathers of the Church, and God the Father. In this paternal foursome, the death of the authority of God the Father is the key to the deaths of the other three. For God the Father legitimizes all authority, according to Dostoevsky. When God's government is thrown into question, all government—that of the family, church, and state—is similarly upset.

In *The Devils*, Dostoevsky shows us the political future of Russia without the fatherhood of God and Tsar. In that novel, we see through the microcosm of a small provincial town what will happen when the leftist intellectuals take over in the name of socialism and communism. They are ruthless, they kill without a thought, they are willing to commit mass murder to realize their dreams. Their souls are at the farthest remove from the equality they preach. They are hateful tyrants.

Milosz noted that Dostoevsky's concern for the political future of Russia was something that was understood both by his conservative Russian admirers, such as Nicholas Berdiaev in 1918, and his Marxist admirers, such as Lunacharsky, the Commissar of Education under Lenin after the 1917 Revolution. *The Devils* was extolled in the communist press "as a novel which had become a reality." Dostoevsky's Western interpreters generally have very little concern with this theme (Frank is a laudable exception). Milosz, a Polish poet who hated what communism had done to his country, saw this political core of Dostoevsky's teaching with great clarity.

Rival Prophets

FRANK SUBTLES HIS FINAL VOLUME ON Dostoevsky, *The Mantle of the Prophet*. Tocqueville, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky are famous for their prophetic diagnoses of the situation of modern Western man. In this fundamental respect, Tocqueville and Nietzsche agree: man is in danger of becoming too tame, too agreeable, too soft, so devoted to petty pleasures that his spiritedness, his self-contempt,

might altogether disappear. Nietzsche fears that the liberal dream of "one herd and no shepherd" might come true. God's death might lead to the end of human striving. Therefore Nietzsche praises tyranny, cruelty, and suffering in the most extravagant possible terms, hoping to foster those qualities which alone can save us from a degraded democratic liberal future.

Tocqueville had a similar nightmare vision. Man might become so degraded, so satisfied, that he would not think of resisting the soft, bureaucratic despotism that threatened to take over Europe and America. Tocqueville's solution, unlike Nietzsche's, was moderate: American-style democracy, based on Christianity.

Dostoevsky disagreed strongly with both Nietzsche and Tocqueville. He saw, as they did not, that the twentieth century would not be a time when mankind would become too tame. Quite the contrary. Man after the "death of God" would perhaps mouth the slogans of Enlightenment equality, but he would act the part of a tyrant more terrible than any earlier tyrant. Dostoevsky was able to see this because he was not a historicist. Human nature does not change, according to Dostoevsky, and so the evil in man is not about to disappear. It will simply break out in all its cruelty if God and immortality fade from man's conscience. By contrast, Nietzsche thought man's nature changeable, that his hatred and anger might really vanish—a prospect, to be sure, that Nietzsche deplored. In the Nietzschean world of the "last man," there is no government and no punishment. Whoever does not fit in goes voluntarily to a therapist. Dostoevsky scorned that naive view, and he was right. There were over 100 million state-sponsored murders under the tyrants Stalin, Mao, and Hitler. No other major writer of the 19th century saw so clearly into the evil heart of the 20th.

Dostoevsky's Patriarchalism

DOSTOEVSKY DESERVES OUR RESPECT for this insight, against the dominant historicism of his time. But his alternative to this atheistic socialism is far less impressive.

In its simplest terms, his solution to the problem of modern man is submission—submission to the authority of the father. But this authority is based not on reason but on faith. When Dostoevsky describes the "elder" system in the Russian monastery, he defines the elder as "a man who takes your soul and your will into his soul and will." Dostoevsky is of course aware of the possibility of abuse: "this instrument of the moral regeneration of man from slavery to freedom and to moral perfectibility . . . may be turned into a double-edged weapon." But he does not regard

this objection as decisive. Submission to Father Zossima is indispensable for the hero Alyosha, and one can extend this analysis to the other fathers in the novel. One must have absolute faith in God, or else "everything is permitted" and life becomes insane or evil. Dostoevsky knows very well that he is demanding a kind of totalitarianism—total, unquestioning submission to One who is Higher.

What is achieved by submitting to fatherly authority is a community of love. Dostoevsky presents a community constituted by loving kindness as the peak of human life. Alyosha brings twelve of the town boys—his twelve disciples, as Frank observes—together into just such a community in the final pages of the novel. At its best, such a community is like a church, where no coercion is necessary, because all are caught up in its spirit. The community of boys under Alyosha's lead is like Ivan's church of the future described in his article on church and state, praised by Father Zossima: the state becomes a church, and physical punishment is no longer needed.

But can anything bigger than a family, a band of friends, or a small religious community really exist on the basis of love? Larger communities need law and other formal restraints on authority. Aristotle points out, in his usual sober way, that if one tries to extend love to include a whole political community, it becomes weak and "watery." Besides, Dostoevsky knows that his doctrine of submission cannot meet the problem of the tyrannical father. It accepts, with open eyes, the rule of the father, whether good or evil, as the price to be paid for a world that makes sense, a world where love can grow and flourish.

I mentioned earlier that Frank is made uneasy by Dostoevsky's surprising suggestion that killing the father Karamazov is like killing God. Let me state more precisely the alternative to Dostoevsky's view. John Locke, for example, who unlike Dostoevsky distinguishes God from an evil father, argues that God puts us into the world unprovided for, because He is good. If God had handed men the things they need on a silver platter, if He had arranged life such that no innocent would ever have to suffer, we would have had no incentive to cultivate our minds and talents. We would live like pigs, contentedly wallowing in the muck. Without pain and suffering, writes Locke, man "would be a very idle unactive creature, and pass his time only in a lazy lethargic dream." Socrates makes a similar point in Plato's *Symposium*. Only the gods are wise and have everything they need. We humans are erotic and needy creatures, he argues, longing for wisdom and plenty. Because we lack that perfection, we must therefore strive for it. Indeed, in all wealthy societies, including America, the wealthiest society in history, men tend to degenerate, because

things are too easy. In this sense, as political scientist John Marini has observed, soft times are hard times.

From this philosophical point of view, Dostoevsky's preoccupation with suffering must be seen as a kind of self-indulgent sentimentality. Philosophers ancient and modern have understood that suffering is part of the price we pay for freedom and excellence. And they have counseled: do not submit to evil, even if one's father is its source.

Rejecting Reason and Nature

EARLY IN THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, Dostoevsky writes, "if he [Alyosha] had decided that there was no immortality and no God, he would at once have become an atheist and a socialist." That is because atheism and socialism go together (as Marx also said). Socialism tries to build the Tower of Babel, which means "to bring down heaven on earth." This is the alternative that Dostoevsky and his characters always see: either the authority of faith, that is, of the mysterious will of God, or the uninhibited and degraded reason of man. In *The Brothers*, the choice is solely between Alyosha the believer and Ivan-Smerdyakov the atheist. (The fourth brother, Dmitry, is in this respect a hybrid of the other three: he vacillates between forceful sinning and still more forceful repentance.) In *Crime and Punishment*, the alternative is Raskolnikov the rational theorist, for whom murder, even mass murder, is permissible, or Raskolnikov the penitent, who, yielding wholly to passion and forgetting all his rational arguments, throws himself at the feet of Sonia, a creature of feeling and emotion, a Christian for whom faith is entirely a matter of sentiment.

To be sure, questioning authority is dangerous if one is not capable of sensible thinking on one's own. As a practical matter, that means most men should follow authority, especially the authority of their fathers. Still, following one's own reason does lead toward the good, if one has the mind for it. According to Dostoevsky, however, every attempt to follow one's own reason leads to misery, perversion, and hatred of everyone and everything. (The first part of Dostoevsky's *Notes from Underground* explores at length the reasoning behind this rejection of reason.) Nothing is forbidden, everything is permitted, as Ivan says. The degraded Smerdyakov shows what that means, as he hatefully echoes the intellectual but decent Ivan. For Dostoevsky, then, either we accept the absolute authority of the father and king and church, or we repudiate human reason and follow nothing but arbitrary will, personal or collective. Just as Dostoevsky said of himself, he is truly a reactionary.

Frank's biography rightly emphasizes that Dostoevsky's great theme is "the conflict between reason and faith," i.e., between "religious irrationalism" and reason understood as social-political radicalism. Although Frank is clearly made uncomfortable by this irrationalism—the likely source of Dostoevsky's anti-Jewish stance, well documented by Frank—he never repudiates it explicitly. Nor does he confront Dostoevsky's profoundly anti-democratic politics. Indeed, Frank calls himself a "Dostoevskian," perhaps because of his immense respect for the man with whom he has mentally dwelled these many years.

Deference to authority has its attractions in a world that seems ever more degraded. Milosz (but not Frank) notes that today's Western intellectuals have a lot in common with Dostoevsky's intelligentsia in *The Brothers* and *The Devils*. But in spite of Dostoevsky's loathing of the intelligentsia, in spite of the soundness of his diagnosis that a Russian revolution would elevate the most degraded cruelty to power, Dostoevsky shares with the intelligentsia of his day and ours, writes Milosz, a "loathing of democracy, which for them is synonymous with bourgeois mediocrity."

Russia seems to have been peculiarly susceptible to the most virulent aspects of 19th-century European thought. That is probably connected to the fact that in Russia neither the Greek and Roman classics, nor the early modern thought of sober men like Locke and Montesquieu, was ever widely accepted in educated circles. Russia's introduction to European philosophy came late, at a time when the leading European thinkers all denied what the earlier tradition from Plato and Cicero through Locke and the American Founders had affirmed: that an accurate understanding of human nature, discovered by reason, is a sound guide for human life and government. Russia moved as it were in a single step directly from the irrational willfulness of its peculiar brand of Christianity and its tradition of despotic politics, to the irrational willfulness of post-Hegelian philosophy with its despotic-utopian schemes completely at odds with the realities of human nature. Dostoevsky's solution, for all its anti-European sentiment, seems to take its departure from the same post-Hegelian premise: only will, and not reason, can guide us.

Dostoevsky vs. Solzhenitsyn

FRANK COMPARES DOSTOEVSKY TO HIS rival, the liberal novelist Turgenev, and finds the latter wanting. In this judgment Frank is surely correct. But I would compare Dostoevsky, the greatest Russian novelist of the 19th century, to Solzhenitsyn, the greatest of the 20th. Unlike Dostoevsky, Solzhenitsyn is confident of reason's ability to guide us, if only we



will consult it. Solzhenitsyn is therefore not at all tormented by resentment against God for the suffering of innocents. On the contrary: it was precisely in the midst of the most enormous suffering deliberately inflicted on innocents in world history—in the belly of Stalin's Gulag—that Solzhenitsyn came to God and "natural law" (*Gulag Archipelago*, "The Ascent"). Like Dostoevsky, Solzhenitsyn is sympathetic to the Old Regime and the Orthodox Church. But in *August 1914* Solzhenitsyn shows that there was also something profoundly wrong with this old regime, namely, its habit of mindless submission to authority and its excessive trust that some Higher Power will solve our problems for us—be it God (Russian Orthodoxy), history (Tolstoy), or the Tsar. What for Dostoevsky is the solution, is for Solzhenitsyn part of the problem.

Solzhenitsyn's own intellectual formation, unlike Dostoevsky's, was aided by the Greek and Roman classics at a crucial time in his life. In *The First Circle*, speaking of himself as a 30-year-old, he writes, "On the planet of philosophy all lands have long since been discovered. I leaf through the ancient philosophers and find my newest discoveries there." The novel contains important themes explicitly linked to the classics, such as the ideal of male friendship and the philosophic life.

In *August 1914*, Solzhenitsyn shows us, through the character of Vorotyntsev, that there was nothing inevitable about the great Russian disaster at the Battle of Tannenberg. The battle could have been won if it had been conducted more sensibly. And if this battle and others like it had been won, there might then have been no

Communist revolution, with the immense carnage and suffering it caused.

Like many other characters in the novel, General Samsonov is a great admirer of Tolstoy. But Samsonov's incompetence is a leading cause of the loss of the battle. Samsonov believed he had learned from Tolstoy that human thought and reason are unimportant. In *War and Peace*, Tolstoy argues that Napoleon's invasion of Russia was defeated by an inevitable course of events which human planning and reason were powerless to effect. Kutuzov, Tolstoy's favorite general, never used his reason to figure out how to defeat Napoleon. He simply waited and allowed himself to be swept along by events. Tolstoy believed that "in history what is known to us is called laws of inevitability, what is unknown is called free will." Therefore there is no need for us to intervene with our puny minds and ineffectual plans. Solzhenitsyn demonstrates in one detail after another how untrue, how debilitating, is this blind trust and faith in the higher authority of history.

In *August 1914* Solzhenitsyn shows the same Russian defect on the political level. Reason could have saved Russia—almost did save Russia—from the impending disaster. The man who understood best how to correct the problems of the Old Regime was Stolypin, who nobly gave his life trying against all odds to implement a system of private property rights and a prudent mixture of hereditary monarchy and representative government grounded in local communities. This would have led to the rise of a landed class of hard-working, independent-minded, and politically responsible farmers who, if all went well,

would have become the backbone of the regime. They would have had both the interest and the power to stop the insane slide into revolution and the abyss, out of which Communism emerged with all its destructive fury. But Stolypin was assassinated by an alliance between the Communist hard Left and the monarchical Right.

In sum, Solzhenitsyn's respectful answer to Dostoevsky may be said to be this: Reason does not lead to the dead end of atheism and rebellion against God. Properly employed, it leads to a well-governed country, a well-tempered Christianity, and a well-governed life. Not that suffering and evil can ever be abolished—as if that were even desirable. But they can be mitigated and curbed, confined to bearable proportions.

Solzhenitsyn echoes, in many respects, the spirit of the American Founders, who created the form of government and the way of life that would challenge and eventually prevail over Russia's bloody experiment in atheistic socialism. Reason, in the founders' view, can lead us to sensible political policies. These policies can be achieved on the basis of government by consent, if the constitutional order is well designed, and if the people have sufficient virtue.

Liberty rightly understood, therefore, not blind submission to authority, is man's best hope for government in this world. This is what separates reasonable accounts of good government from all forms of traditionalism, including Dostoevsky's.


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Book Review by James Higgins

TWO STEPS AHEAD, ONE STEP BACK

Globalization and Its Discontents, by Joseph Stiglitz.
W.W. Norton, 282 pages, \$24.95



IN THE OLD LIBERAL ECONOMICS, TAX RATES had no effect on incentives, command-and-control regulations never had unintended consequences, and monetary policy was purely decorative. Privatization of retirement accounts would be as dangerous as privatization of nuclear weapons. The Phillips Curve, which had no theoretical basis whatsoever even in the Keynesian model, guaranteed that there was a tradeoff between unemployment and inflation that omniscient liberal economists and legislators could fine-tune at will.

Some time during the Reagan and Thatcher free-market booms, the smarter and younger liberal economists grudgingly became aware that their old belief system didn't work. Without ever admitting error, they tiptoed away from the mantras listed above. Among the best and brightest of the new bunch was Joseph Stiglitz. Stiglitz chaired Bill Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors for four years, then moved on to be Chief Economist of the World Bank for another three before sharing the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001 for his work on market information asymmetries.

This year Stiglitz weighs in with *Globalization and Its Discontents*, in which he attempts, commendably, to take an empirical rather than emotional look at the costs and benefits of globalizations. Almost undebated for decades, globalization has become an issue in the last several years, as meetings of multilateral economic bodies have turned into urban war zones. Stiglitz has made his book succinct and readable, rare accomplishments for an economist and ones for which he deserves applause.

By "globalization," Stiglitz limits himself to meaning increasingly interrelated global trade and financial activity, rather than more dubious notions like "cultural imperialism." Indeed,

Stiglitz's focus is on the work and effects of the three main postwar multinational economic entities: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. Focusing on their policies toward Russia throughout the 1990s, East Asia in 1997-98, and Argentina from the late 1990s through the present, Stiglitz is unsparing in his criticism of the mistakes these multinational entities have made.

Stiglitz recognizes that globalization has brought important benefits to poorer countries and at any rate is not going away soon. But he notes with surprise and disappointment that all three entities are dominated by the countries that founded them and continue to provide most of the funds—chiefly Western Europe, the United States and Canada, and Japan. Saving particular ire for the IMF, he reports that all three organizations have in the main become captives of the people and worldviews of those in control: financiers and finance ministers for the IMF and World Bank, commercial interests and trade ministers for the WTO.

As economic theorist Gomer Pyle might say, "Sur-prise, sur-prise!" A student of Hayek or of James Buchanan and public choice theory would not only have observed such developments now but would have predicted them from the structure of the organizations. Still, it is laudable that a basically liberal economist is able to acknowledge such deep flaws in multinational government-sponsored organizations.

The ironic counterpoint to this, however, is that he is more ambivalent about free trade, the one policy that 20 years ago he and nearly every liberal economist would have supported wholeheartedly.

Stiglitz would improve the workings of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO by giving

a greater voice to the constituents in the poorer countries. Although the notion that poor people in countries with bad governments shouldn't be made lab animals for haughty IMF (read: French) bureaucrats is laudable, if this proposal were put into effect it would run into the fate of any plan to have borrowers control a bank. "Economic democracy" doesn't work.

WHILE STIGLITZ DOES HAVE A remarkably realistic understanding for a liberal of many aspects of how the world economy works, he gratingly makes two blunders over and over. First, he describes the IMF's pinched proclivity for requiring poor countries to raise taxes and balance their budgets as being the handiwork of "free market" economists, whom he pointedly distinguishes from "first-class" economists. Note to Professor Stiglitz: since Ronald Reagan's victory in 1980, the central policy of mainstream free-market thought has been to reduce taxes and spur economic growth even if this means running a deficit. Second, he equates free markets with what Mikhail Gorbachev used to refer to as "wild capitalism": government's turning a blind eye to the wealthy and powerful's plundering the weak and impoverished by any means at hand. Thus, Stiglitz blames the economic catastrophe of 1990s Russia on his philosophical opponents rather than acknowledging that national and international government entities alike were surprised at how thoroughly Russia's kleptocracy dominated its new economy.

Let us hope that liberal economists learn as much in the next 20 years as Stiglitz's book suggests that they have learned in the last 20.

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Book Review by Sally C. Pipes

UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT

Tilting the Playing Field: Schools, Sports, Sex and Title IX, by Jessica Gavora.
Encounter Books, 181 pages, \$24.95

WITH SO MANY BOOKS THAT PROMISE more than they deliver, it is refreshing to find a volume that delivers more than it promises. Jessica Gavora's *Tilting the Playing Field* aims to deconstruct the abuses surrounding Title IX, and does so in a way that will prove enlightening to the general reader and indispensable for the public-policy specialist.

Title IX of the Education Amendment, with bipartisan support, passed Congress in 1972. It reads: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

The co-sponsor of the original legislation was Texas Republican John Tower. The author of the original Title IX regulations in 1975 was Caspar Weinberger, then Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. In those days, however, the women's movement began its Long March through American institutions. Its initial battering ram was the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, which failed to gain ratification. Militant gender feminists then looked for another vehicle and found it in Title IX. As Gavora explains, a dogmatic, dedicated cadre of radical feminists hijacked Title IX. With the help of compliant courts, activist lawyers, echo-chamber journalists, weak-kneed administrators, and politically correct politicians, they got virtually everything they wanted.

A respected speechwriter and political analyst, Gavora does a fine job of confronting the dogma of proportionality, the notion that men and women should be equally represented in all endeavors, including sports. As anyone without a grudge against reality knows, however, men and women are not undifferentiated in their abilities and inclinations. To assert otherwise is to ignore natural differences, as well as effort, and personal choice among both women and men. Further, statistical disparities among groups and individuals, as Thomas Sowell has often pointed out, are the rule rather than the exception. But Gavora shows that the quest for government-enforced leveling ignores such considerations.

The author introduces us to Donald Sabo, called to testify in a Title IX case against Brown University that was used to establish that Title IX had a "remedial" purpose. A character straight out of Tom Wolfe, Mr. Sabo is a

feminist theorist and sociologist at something called D'Youville College. He told the court that women do not have interests of their own, that their interests are determined for them by society. Yet, he did not explain how the feminist vanguard miraculously escaped this social conditioning. They not only have interests of their own but have appointed themselves judges of the aspirations of all women.

Consider also Colette Dowling, author of *The Frailty Myth*, who tells anyone who will listen that given equal training, women will some



day achieve physical parity with men. Actually, they won't, and Gavora is to be credited for explaining how a bizarre feminist wish-list now passes for science and is repeated uncritically by journalists.

LEGAL ACTION UNDER TITLE IX STEPPED up once courts awarded monetary damages, making greed the abettor of militant ideology. Egging on this descent was Norma Cantu, President Bill Clinton's choice to head the civil rights division of the U.S. Department of Education. Accurately dubbed a "quota queen" by Institute for Justice's Clint Bolick, Cantu deployed a 700-member staff and \$60 million budget. She reviewed 240 schools concerning which no civil rights complaint had been filed, and demanded that her enforcement squads double the number of complaints received. It is as though, in the absence of calls, the police were instructed to create a crime wave.

Under Cantu's lash, the easiest way for schools to show their Title IX compliance was to adopt proportionality as their goal. But the easiest way

to get proportionality, Gavora proves, was not to provide more opportunities for women, because even when the opportunities are equalized, women do not choose to participate in sports at the same rate as men. Accordingly, the easiest and fastest way to achieve proportionality was to cut men's programs, and the author lists the casualties. These include longstanding baseball programs at Providence College and Colgate, the wrestling team at Princeton, and the UCLA swim team, which had sent so many to the Olympics. The cuts include numerous wrestling teams and football programs at Boston University, and at Cal State San Francisco, and other Cal State campuses.

Far from being a tragic unintended consequence of Title IX, this was probably the outcome the quota forces had in mind all along. After all, wrestling and football smack of maleness, as Mariah Burton Nelson argued in her feminist classic, *The Stronger Women Get, the More Men Love Football*. The National Organization of Women, it should be recalled, once claimed that Super Bowl Sunday was the occasion for a veritable orgy of wife beating, a bogus charge now exposed and exploded.

When women athletes excel, notes Gavora, the quota feminists attribute this not to the athletes' training, determination, or skill, but to Title IX. The athletes are portrayed as beneficiaries of federal law, the "welfare queens of sports." The author shows, too, that women's sports were on the rise before the advent of Title IX.

"Denial of opportunity for men is occurring," writes Gavora, "because a group of people with a narrow agenda has worked hard and successfully behind the scenes to make it happen." Yet the law does not call for punishing men in order to advantage women athletes. On the contrary: Title IX demands equal treatment under law.

The question then becomes what to do about it. Gavora closes this tough-minded, well-researched book by deftly swatting the ball into the legislators' court.

"Re-leveling the playing field in American education will not be easy," she concludes. "But those who go into this battle have at their side two often underrated assets. First, it's the law. And second, it's the right thing to do."

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Book Review by Julie Ann Ponzi

YA-YA MOTHERHOOD

The Paradox of Natural Mothering, by Chris Bobel.
Temple University Press, 248 pages, \$18.95

IT'S OFTEN AMUSING TO OBSERVE THE MENTAL acrobatics of feminist writers who try to skirt the logical conclusions of their own premises. Like the stereotypical belle who can't decide which gown to wear at the ball, some feminists seem to reject all attempts at definitive description.

Somewhat along those lines, Chris Bobel's *The Paradox of Natural Mothering* is an examination of a subset of feminists, so-called "natural mothers," that probes deep into the lives and core beliefs of these women. On the whole, it gives an extremely careful, thoughtful, and intriguing description of their views which makes for good reading and much food for thought. But Bobel is critical of these women, who call themselves feminists. Feminism and motherhood is the "paradox" here.

"Natural mothers" are a growing subset within feminist circles and among the "stay-at-home mom" crowd who see their work in the home as the natural outgrowth of their radical left-wing politics. These women and their move-

ment (as described by Bobel) combine three interconnected elements: Voluntary Simplicity (they reject most material definitions of success and try to live as simply as possible), Attachment Parenting (the belief that one's children are best reared at home in a child-centered world), and cultural feminism.

"Natural mothers" vigorously reject the feminist model of putting women on an equal footing with men in order to make them equal competitors in the marketplace. Like more traditional or conservative women, they see men and women as equal in importance but different in their roles. Unlike traditional women, however, "natural mothers" reject the marketplace altogether. It is a real question (which Bobel asks but never answers) as to what role men should play in their world. Motherhood and things female are so esteemed by these women that their claim to support equal but different roles for men seems a little disingenuous. As breadwinners, men seem to play a minimal role in their lives because the goal seems to be to get as far away as possible

from needing the bread they win.

In the end, Bobel questions the claim to feminism made by "natural mothers" because she cannot fathom their apparent acceptance of traditional gender roles. This is disappointing, because the argument is so shallow. There is no paradox in accepting feminism and accepting "natural motherhood." The "natural motherhood" Bobel describes is the closest thing to an authentic feminism that I've seen. It embraces the *female* in the feminists and defends it as a superior way of life. These women seem to be far more interesting and worthy challengers of conservatives than Bobel and other garden-variety feminists. Ultimately, the real paradox of "natural motherhood" is the paradox of feminism itself. The tension that exists between things male and female is there for a purpose that is both beautiful and maddening. We ignore it or glorify it at our peril.

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Book Review by John B. Kienker

PROFILES IN BANALITY

Profiles in Courage for Our Time, edited by Caroline Kennedy.
Hyperion, 354 pages, \$23.95

AT LAST, A SEQUEL (OF SORTS) TO THE original *Profiles in Courage* written by Ted Sorensen under the pen-name John F. Kennedy. This time, Caroline Kennedy lends her family name only to the "editing" rather than the authoring, leaving that to a team of professional writers, using their own names.

The new book rounds up recipients of the JFK Library Foundation Profile in Courage Award, bestowed annually to a "politician of distinction." In Caroline's words, the book has been published to continue inspiring "a generation of Americans to believe in the power of government."

Sorenson's original book sketched principled moments in the careers of 19th-century Senators, including John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay,

Daniel Webster, and Sam Houston. The new *Profiles* shows how much "our time" has degenerated from theirs. Whether it's E.J. Dionne on Lowell Weicker, Marian Wright Edelman on Corkin Cherubini, or Steve Roberts on Michael Synar, the profiles for this new gallery of worthies are sadly predictable: Some busybody inspired by Jack or Bobby (only Caroline praises Teddy) struggles against entrenched reactionaries in order to promote unlimited government through tax hikes, gun bans, race-baiting, and the fight for something called "environmental justice."

Aside from its unrelieved mediocrity and political bias, the greatest fault of *Profiles in Courage for Our Time* is that no one associated with the project understands what courage is—and what it isn't.

For example, the final chapter honors the "Heroes of September 11." After an obligatory bow to firemen, policemen, and rescue workers, only two figures are singled out by name. New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani and President George W. Bush? No, Palos Heights, Illinois, Mayor Dean Koldenhoven for—what else?—defending a Muslim foundation against local bigots; and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, whose speeches against poverty and AIDS (forget about the war on terror) make him "a true Profile in Courage, not just for our time but for all time." This book can't even get the easy ones right.

John B. Kienker is editorial assistant of the Claremont Review of Books.

BOOKS IN BRIEF



I'll Be Short: Essentials for a Decent Working Society, by Robert B. Reich.
Beacon Press, 122 pages. \$20



Former Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich first gained notice in the 1980s as a champion of "neoliberalism." The term was never clear. Neoliberals generally took the same stands as paleoliberals and mesoliberals, except that they uttered words such as "high-tech." Their distinguishing trait was a grating smugness, which helped sink the presidential hopes of their leading political figure, Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts.

Republicans have held the Boston statehouse ever since Dukakis left, and now Reich is seeking the Democratic nomination to reclaim it for his party. *I'll Be Short* is a campaign manifesto of sorts, a cut-and-paste from other writings. The title refers both to the book's brevity and the author's diminutive stature—and is just about the only light note in a heavy-handed statement of party dogma.

Corporations rule the government, he says. "After burying Washington in campaign contributions, Enron got exactly what it wanted." No, what Enron most wanted was ratification of the Kyoto Accords, which would have enabled it to profit from emissions trading. But never mind: mentioning the Great Corporate Satan gives him an opening to lay out the old agenda of more workplace regulation.

In his eagerness to become a commander in the class war, Reich leaves logic behind. On the book's first page, he notes ominously that most Americans pay more in payroll taxes than in income taxes. On the second page, he blames income-tax cuts for the coming crunch in social security, forgetting that the system relies entirely on payroll taxes.

Although Reich is running for governor, he spends most of the book on national issues outside state jurisdiction. The exception is education policy. His diagnosis—"not nearly enough money"—is as false as it is trite. Real spending per pupil has gone way up in recent years. The problem lies with teacher unions that stifle reforms, but Reich fears to take them on.

Cliché follows cliché. He attacks "trickle-down economics" and the "Ozzie and Harriet" stereotype of family values. He even damns "three-martini lunches," not realizing that they died with Dean Martin.

Reich is a nimble thinker capable of much better work. Here, alas, he produces a diatribe that is not only short but slight.

—John J. Pitney Jr.,
Claremont McKenna College



*Every Handgun Is Aimed at You:
The Case for Banning Handguns*,
by Josh Sugarmann, The New Press,
208 pages, \$24.95



Josh Sugarmann, founder of the anti-gun Violence Policy Center, argues that handguns cannot be anything other than a force for evil, and that nothing less than a nationwide ban will undo that evil. Hardly a new argument, but the appearance of John Lott's hugely popular *More Guns, Less Crime* a few years ago made the restatement of the anti-gun case urgently necessary. On its face, the argument is absurd, ignoring the fact that 99 percent of handguns will never be used for a criminal act, and that many will be used to deter crime. And the case against handguns gets weaker by the moment: Michael Bellesiles, whom Sugarmann cites as an authority, whose book, *Arming America*, stands exposed as a fraud, and the Second Amendment is increasingly understood to invoke an individual rather than collective right. Accidental deaths and injuries from handguns continue to drop. U.S. cities with handgun bans in effect (Chicago and D.C.) vie annually for the title of murder capital. Anti-handgun lawsuits are being thrown out, and 44 states have now passed right-to-carry laws. Those states aren't experiencing a rise in handgun crime, but England—where handguns were banned in 1997—is seeing a spectacular increase. So buy this book. Then take it to the nearest range and put it out of its misery.

—Daniel C. Palm, Azusa Pacific University



*Keeping the Compound Republic:
Essays on American Federalism*,
by Martha Derthick.
Brookings Institution Press, 196 pages, \$17.95



Students of American politics wanting to refresh or deepen their understanding of our form of federalism—what James Madison called our

"compound republic"—can turn to Martha Derthick's *Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Federalism*. Derthick, Julia Cooper Professor Emerita in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia and former Director of Governmental Studies at the Brookings Institution, is a prolific author. The 11 essays in this volume touch on and summarize many of the arguments she has made at much greater length in her many books.

"American federalism," she writes, "is a very large elephant indeed, and it is hard for a lone observer to grasp the properties of the whole beast. One needs to be abreast of constitutional doctrines; of legislative, judicial, and administrative practices over the whole range of governmental activities; . . . and more. To understand the condition of federalism, one needs to comprehend the functioning of the whole polity." In this splendid volume, Derthick continually demonstrates this level of comprehension. In clear, powerful prose, she examines the founding generation's understanding of federalism; the way in which "national programs, institutions, and techniques of influence [especially federal grants-in-aid] came together to enlarge national power at state and local governments' expense;" and the consequences of the public's "sharp devalu[ation]" of "federalism as a constitutional principle."

A clear theme running through her essays is the profound impact that past U.S. Supreme Courts have had on altering the original federal design and concentrating power in the federal government through their decisions on reapportionment, criminal procedure, the establishment clause, and incorporation. She notes that, by contrast, the Rehnquist Court has become the great defender of federalism. She welcomes its federalism decisions, because they have "encouraged Americans to contemplate the subject." By so doing, she hopes they will renew their commitment to "a form of government that divides and disperses official power, with the goal of making it representative and grounding its exercise in practicality as opposed to a political rhetoric that is all too often the demagogic style of mass democracy."

—Ralph A. Rossum,
Claremont McKenna College

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C O R R E S P O N D E N C E

The Truth About Lincoln

Dear Editor:

Thomas "Krannawitter's" review of my book, *The Real Lincoln* (Spring 2002), is filled with misstatements of my position, straw-man arguments, and fabrications (i.e., lies). Thus, it is quite appropriate that his "review" is titled "Dishonest About Abe."

For example, I never say that Lincoln "did not care a whit" about slavery, as Krannawitter absurdly states. These words do not appear in my book, nor do I insinuate it. And I say in my book that Lincoln advocated the Whig economic agenda "over and over again," not the pursuit of empire, per se. Nor do I ever say that Lincoln wanted to talk of the *Dred Scott* decision "only as an avenue for championing the nationalization of money." This is also a lie.

Krannawitter is certainly aware that I admitted in print two months before his "review" was published that I repeated the mistake of the "Siamese Twins" quote from a secondary source and promised to correct the mistake in the next printing, which I have done. It is dishonest of him to make such a big deal of this in full knowledge that I have admitted the mistake and have fixed it.

He is also wrong in his sneering comment that I supposedly have no knowledge that Calhoun advocated the protective tariff in 1816. My discussion in *The Real Lincoln* of the New England secession movement after Jefferson's election acknowledges that the Jeffersonians felt guilty that their embargo did such economic damage to New England and so they supported a tariff. Calhoun did change his position after abandoning his nationalism, however.

Krannawitter also contradicts himself when he says that I do not understand that all economics "is political economics" and then, in the very next sentence, identifies me as a public-choice economist. I am in fact a student of Nobel Laureate James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, the inventors of public choice economics, or the economics of politics. Krannawitter is obviously in a fog and grasping at straws here.

Krannawitter seems just as ignorant of international economics as he is of public choice. His statement that "tariffs were in the service of free trade" is an Orwellian absurdity.

I do not portray Calhoun as "a great defender of freedom" or "celebrate" him, as Krannawitter says. I merely quote him several times with regard to specific economic issues that he was deeply involved in. This is another of Krannawit-

ter's straw-man arguments.

The notion that Calhoun "invented the doctrine of legal or constitutional secession" is ridiculous. There were many voices in support of the right of secession prior to Calhoun's theorizing, including the New England Federalists and such figures as the Pennsylvania abolitionist William Rawle whose book, *A View of the Constitution*, was used at West Point and argued that there was a constitutional right of secession. Krannawitter ignores all of this because he wants to associate secession only with Calhoun's defense of slavery. This is dishonest and misleading scholarship.

Krannawitter selectively quotes Southerners like Calhoun and Alexander Stephens when they support his argument, but ignores all others, in another wool-over-your-eyes literary gimmick. He makes no mention of my chapter on Lincoln's evisceration of constitutional liberty in the North, my chapter that makes the case for the right of secession, the one on how Lincoln micromanaged the waging of war on civilians in violation of international law, how Reconstruction achieved little more than establishing a monopoly of power for the Republican Party, and how all of Lincoln's economic agenda was put into place in the first eighteen months of his administration. This is all embarrassing to Krannawitter, so he just ignores it and resorts instead to juvenile name-calling.

Thomas J. DiLorenzo
Loyola College
Baltimore, MD

Thomas Krannawitter replies:

Thomas DiLorenzo complains that I have misrepresented him. But one cannot get through two paragraphs of his letter without encountering the same kind of fraud that plagues his book. DiLorenzo denies writing that Lincoln advocated "the pursuit of empire." Nor, he pleads, did he say that Lincoln used the *Dred Scott* case to champion the nationalization of money.

On page 263 of his book, however, he writes: "Lincoln and the Republicans certainly had a cause: the cause of centralized government and the pursuit of empire. They said it over and over again..." On page 68, DiLorenzo asserts that "when commenting on the *Dred Scott* decision," and "in virtually every one of the Lincoln-Douglas debates," Lincoln "made it a point to champion

the nationalization of money..." Apparently DiLorenzo not only has a problem recalling Lincoln's words, he cannot remember what he himself wrote!

I was unaware that DiLorenzo had confessed the "Siamese Twins" to be a misquotation. Even when he admits mistakes, however, he can't help committing another. He writes that he "repeated the mistake of the 'Siamese Twins' quote from a secondary source," but in his book he does not cite a secondary source; he cites Roy Basler's one-volume collection of Lincoln's works (*Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings*). One wonders if DiLorenzo is congenitally careless or deliberately mendacious.

That all economics is political economics is simply another way of saying that economics is ultimately a means for achieving political ends. An example is the application of economic pressure, such as tariffs, in the effort to move a slave society, such as the antebellum South, toward the political goal of free society. DiLorenzo and many other "public choice economists" reverse this understanding by trying to reduce all political questions to economic ones. But this "capitalist" theory of economic determinism is as false as the Communist version.

As for the putative right of secession, DiLorenzo, like many disunionists before him, stubbornly confuses it with what the founders called the right of revolution. Far from defending a state's constitutional right to secede from the Union—that is, a right of a minority to reject the results of a free constitutional election—the founders affirmed a natural right of revolution that can be invoked only when the equal natural rights of men are violated by the government under which they live. But it is precisely the idea of equal natural rights that the South rejected in the Calhounian doctrine that some human beings can rightfully enslave other human beings, based on the color of their skin.

This is the ugly truth of the American South at the brink of the Civil War, though its ugliness makes it no less true. By rejecting the idea of human equality, Calhoun and later Southern secessionists were not defending the principles of the founders, they were overturning them—as they publicly and repeatedly stated. Abraham Lincoln understood this, which is why, on the eve of the Civil War, he wrote to his friend Alexander Stephens, then the Vice President of the Confederacy, that "the only substantial difference between us" is that "you think slavery is right and ought to be extended; while we think it wrong and ought to be restricted."

War-Crimes Fiction

Dear Editor:

I heartily concur with Thomas Krannawitter's review of DiLorenzo's pathetic book. Chapter 7, on Lincoln's alleged atrocities against Southern civilians, was of special interest to me because I teach a course in the laws of war at George Washington University Law School. While there are a number of factual and other problems, one stands out for comment. DiLorenzo begins the chapter by describing certain specific rules on treatment of civilians and civilian property in war, supposedly adopted by governments at an international conference in 1863. At the end of the chapter he again refers to the 1863 conference and its rules, and lambastes the U.S. government for violating them during the Civil War.

The 1863 conference is a fiction, as are the rules it allegedly adopted. No such conference ever took place. There was a conference on the law of war in Geneva in 1864, but it only concerned medical activities and wounded soldiers, not civilians (and anyway the United States did not attend). The first conference to adopt a treaty dealing with civilians and civilian property was held at The Hague in 1899, more than 30 years after Lincoln's death.

Burrus M. Carnahan

George Washington University Law School
Washington, DC

Churchill's Imperialism

Dear Editor:

It was good to read Larry P. Arnn's review, "Winston Is Back," in your spring issue, and I thank him for his complimentary remarks about my book. I much enjoyed the first and third parts of the review, but have a few comments to make on its middle part, the part headed "India."

The lessons or suggestions Arnn draws from British imperial experience to guide policy towards uncongenial neighbours in our global society may or may not be wise ones—I leave aside that tempting field of controversy!—but I have to say that he has too genial and generous an idea of Churchill the imperialist. His idea of the Empire and, when it came into being, the Commonwealth was of an organization whose primary purpose was to support the 'mother country' and to reflect its values. The "white dominions" could easily do this; India and the colonies, much less surely. The great man's rhetoric about "helping the Indian people along the road to self-government," insofar as it was not just conventional claptrap, was literally misleading, inasmuch as

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his idea of self-government for the Indians included—no, insisted upon!—the preservation of the Princely States.

Beyond that, like many fellow conservatives, he had a visceral inability to imagine Indians in the very highest offices of state; self-government, however genuine or not at the lower levels, ended at the doors of the Vice-Regal Palace. And I stick by what I wrote about Churchill's general ignorance about the cultures of the Empire's non-white populations. He was ignorant and prejudiced about them, and positively avoided meeting members of them, on the rare occasions when he might have done so. Clement Attlee rightly judged, that no matter how up-to-date and insightful Churchill was when he looked across the Atlantic and the English Channel, when he thought about India he was still the cavalry subaltern of 1897. (And, by the way, the fanatic who assassinated Gandhi was not a Muslim, as Arnn implies, but a Hindu.)

Strange and wonderful, is it not, that some of the very many parts of this diverse and brilliant man should have been so unregenerate?

Geoffrey Best

St. Antony's College
Oxford, UK

Larry P. Arnn replies:

Thanking Geoffrey Best for his reply, I differ with him on the question of Churchill and India. Best says that Churchill "had a visceral inability to imagine Indians in the various highest offices of the state...." But Churchill says over and over that the policy should be to "entrust able, educated Indians, with whom alone the government of India can be conducted, with an ever broader share of responsibility in the administration..." (House of Commons, March 29, 1933). He voted for that more than once in his career.

Best objects that Churchill wished to preserve the Princely States, and in the same breath he objects that Churchill wished India to "reflect the values" of the mother country. The Princely

States were traditional to India, not Britain, and Churchill supported them partly for that reason. He supported them within the context of continued British authority in India. He argued that they would be less likely to offend the well-being of the Indian people than a national party working for the expulsion of Britain. Perhaps Churchill is false in this argument, but that takes proving.

Best says that Churchill "positively avoided meeting" members of the Empire's nonwhite populations. He should read in Sir Martin Gilbert's fifth volume the account of Churchill's meeting with Mr. G.D. Birla, an emissary of Gandhi. Birla writes to Gandhi: "Curiously enough one of my most pleasant experiences was meeting Mr. Winston Churchill, the strongest opponent of the bill...yet I found him no fire-eater. He asked me to lunch at Chartwell, his country home." (Birla does write to Gandhi that Churchill is poorly informed about India.) Later in 1935 Birla cables to Churchill that he hopes Churchill will be added to the British Cabinet.

I repeat that this is a good book. There is more and better to say on the subject of Churchill and India than it says.

Steinbeck, Churchill, and the War

Dear Editor:

Christopher Flannery has beautifully crafted his review of a new edition of nonfiction by John Steinbeck ("Steinbeck in Good Conscience," Spring 2002). I wish to add a word to his discussion of the political effects of the March 1942 novel, *The Moon is Down*.

Winston Churchill was desperately interested in ways to burn and blast the Axis during the long build-up to an Allied invasion of the European continent. There were few options. Strategic bombing was one. Guerrilla war was another, and in mid-1940 he set up the Special Operations Executive to "set Europe ablaze." When Steinbeck's *Moon* appeared, the Prime Minister was excited; he admired the book and later screened the movie at Chequers. Churchill prodded the minister directing SOE to air-drop small explosions and sabotage materials to occupied countries, in line with Steinbeck's ideas. But the gentleman, Lord Selbourne, had recently decided that sabotage by civilians would bring unacceptable Nazi reprisals, so he stood opposed. Still, Churchill's interests in partisan warfare and in "direct action" by experts and military personnel never diminished, and he continued to promote them through 1945.

Christopher C. Harmon

Marine Corps University
Quantico, VA

A PROPER MEMORIAL

by Elliott Banfield

OUR GOVERNMENT HAS A FOREIGN policy, a domestic policy, a monetary policy; but it lacks an architectural policy. This lack is generally unnoticed because our key public buildings (the courthouses, the state capitols, etc.) were handed down to us as heirlooms, and there seems little for us to do but preserve these monuments. But the destruction of the Twin Towers revealed the ongoing need for architectural thinking and doing. No sooner had the dust cleared than the cry went up: There must be a Memorial. One might have supposed that every designer in the land would have rushed to his drawing board in reponse to this request. But this didn't happen. Instead a Commission was formed that after a long time produced six tentative plans for the 16-acre World Trade Center site. These plans generated a lot of controversy (inevitable when the government takes over the role of Adam Smith's invisible hand), but none of them addressed the question of the memorial.

The reigning assumption is that a memorial can only exist in the context of some Grand Scheme, and that once the Scheme is approved by some Great Ruler (or All-Powerful Commission), then and only then, can the designers turn their attention to it. But this thinking is wrong: the site is large enough so that it can accomodate almost any memorial. And why shouldn't the memorial dictate (to an extent) the design of the site?

In spite of the ongoing distractions, however, one good proposal has emerged: a monumental column (shown opposite), suggested by the vet-

eran critic Henry Reed. This idea is sound. It is proven sound. This architectural motif was invented in ancient Rome (at the time of Trajan) and has been copied and developed on countless occasions since. The beauty of the thing is evident: it stands tall and proud, conveying a dignified, almost defiant repose. It can be seen from a distance, yet it occupies very little space. The land once occupied by Nelson Rockefeller's boondoggle can become a neighborhood again, with the monument at its center giving it a distinct character, without overshadowing it with the memory of a great atrocity.

The rendering is, of course an artist's fantasy, mere lines on paper. But the fantasy is not wholly removed from reality. The column is shown in a park setting. This idea is consistent with the plans of the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, which suggest that the final design of Ground Zero will include a group of tall buildings clustered around a small (perhaps eight acre) park. This park will contain the memorial.

The view presented here shows a view from the south (looking up along Greenwich Street) or, alternatively, from the west, looking along Dey Street towards the Hudson River. Depending on a number of factors, the result might resemble other parts of the city, where densely built-up streets interface with park space. Readers familiar with New York may be reminded of Fifth Avenue along Central Park. The rendering shows (as best it can) a gilded, winged figure bearing two wreaths, intended as a reference to the towers. This figure would be viewed only from a distance, so it would not require the


highest level of finish; but the base would be an opportunity for the designer to introduce finely detailed relief sculpture. It might include the Seal of the City, supported by a fireman and a policeman. Throughout the design there would be ample opportunity to use rich materials and well developed ornamentation. The Alexander Column in St. Petersburg, Russia, for example has a monolithic pillar of red granite that is 83 feet tall. It is hard to understand why that monument, created in the 1840s, could not be surpassed by the vastly richer and (we like to suppose) more sophisticated America of the present day.

Another question arises: Do the craftsmen and artists required for this project exist? Perhaps not. But modern technology offers the hope that new methods can be used to achieve old ends. The computer and other machines may allow a single person to do the work of scores. What holds back progress is the determination of our architects to "progress" toward ever newer and more outlandish results.

Is there any chance that Henry Reed's idea will be adopted? Well, the forces of modernism, postmodernism, and poor taste will surely be arrayed against it. But these forces will have to generate their own proposals. If Reed's column is set against, say, a Maya Lin trench or an Oklahoma City assortment of chairs, the public may at last be ready to accept the superiority of the classical over the modern school of design.

Elliott Banfield is the art director of the Claremont Review of Books and an artist who lives and works in New York City.





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Today, our nation is at war with enemies who despise our way of life and think us weak and corrupt. They are wrong, but too many Americans are unwilling to say why, having absorbed the nihilism of ivory-tower intellectuals and the cynicism of popular culture, which deny the self-evident truths on which our country was founded. The Claremont Institute is not embarrassed to say that those who denigrate our heritage are mistaken—and we can explain why. Other conservative organizations share our dedication to limited government, free markets, and a strong national defense. But only the Claremont Institute is devoted to understanding how the moral and political philosophy of the American Founding can guide us today.

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